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historically Australia’s ample supply of coal has underpinned its power 
system. Competing countries however have used a variety of different 
energy sources and, as a result of this diversity, many have a more 
resilient power system to provide future electrical power. 
this report looks at Australia’s global position with respect to 
itsresource-rich competitors.
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4         Part 1: Australia’s global position
Australia’s dominant energy supply resource has historically 
defined the structure of its stationary power generation and 
consumption. A plentiful local energy resource supply by way 
of coal has underpinned the international competitiveness of 
Australia’s power system, bringing investment, particularly in 
power intensive industries. Competing countries with scarce 
energy resources and vulnerable to international energy markets 
have had to adapt by investing in efficiency, technology and 
diversification throughout the energy transformation chain to 
meet demand. These investments have prepared them for a 
future where fossil-fuel based primary energy supply may be 
constrained and/or global environmental policies may constrain 
or force adaptation of the power system and power intensive 
industries.
In a three step process we will provide a series of papers 
entitled “Delivering a Competitive Australian Power System.” 
 • In stage one, we analyse Australia’s current global position  
  with respect to its resource rich competitors.  
 • In stage two we will seek to establish a target position  
  in 2035 for the Australian power economy to remain  
  competitive.  
 • In stage three we will examine the possible routes to reach  
  the target position. 
Traditionally power economy analysis has been conducted on 
a detailed, bottom up approach based on complex, regional, 
supply and demand projections. This analysis seeks to deviate 
from bottom up analysis to provide a strategic, national (top 
down) analysis of the power economy over long time frames. 
To do this we have compared the Australian power economy, 
not to other OECD countries, but to countries that also have 
natural resources for sale on the global market; but importantly 
resources that need to be processed using significant amounts 
of power. 
In 2008, metals processing and fabrication in Australia:
 • consumed 27% of Australian power,  
 • employed 151,000 people, and  
 • contributed 2% to GDP. 
so it  
 • represents the biggest sector for the power economy,  
 • is an important contributor to the economy as a whole,  
  and  
 • can be used as an indicator of power economy   
  performance.
  
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To assist in the complex analysis, we define and construct a 
holistic parameter we term the “Power Economy Resilience 
Index.” This index allows us to compare in a systematic and 
rational way the efficiency, diversity and security of national 
power systems. The Power Economy Resilience Index also 
allows us to consider Australia’s future position with respect  
to its competitors.
The key findings of this first report are:- 
 • In most cases a country’s power economy reflects its  
  historic inheritance in terms of local natural resources.  
  However, some countries have experienced problems  
  as a result of insufficient supply which have caused them  
  to diversify and enhance their infrastructure leading to  
  greater resilience. 
 • For good reasons, Australia has historically sought  
  competitive advantage for its power economy   
  by harnessing its abundant supply of coal for power  
  generation, which attracted substantial investment  
  in power hungry metals processing industries   
  like aluminium, which in turn part funded power   
  infrastructure for future decades.
 • Since 1990 though, Australia has shed 53,000 jobs from  
  the metals processing and fabrication sector and lost  
  global market share in metals processing, to countries  
  with  more resilient power economies.
 • With increased global demand for energy and concerns  
  over carbon emissions, Australia’s power system now  
  presents a risk to current consumers and future investors  
  because of its fossil fuel reliance.
 • Australia has one of the least resilient power economies  
  of any of its global competitors and the step-changes  
  required to improve this are not in evidence.
The consequences of these findings are:
   1. Australia could continue to lose market share and  
    shed jobs from the metals processing and fabrication  
    industry to our resource rich competitors, and
   2. Australian electricity users could experience large  
    increases in price as a result of a lack of resilience.
To avoid these consequences, transformation of the power 
economy is not merely a desired, but a necessary, condition for 
the continued economic and social prosperity of this country.  
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With its wealth of natural resources and resilient economy, 
Australia considers itself to be the “lucky country”. Between 
1990 and 2008 real GDP has grown by a yearly average of  
3.4% fed by mean yearly real export growth of 5.3%.  
Vast deposits of mineral resources: 19% of the world’s bauxite 
reserves, 17% of the world’s iron ore reserves, 13% of the 
world’s copper reserves and 12% of the world’s gold reserves, 
have boosted exports and generated wealth for development 
and stability.
Whilst Australia has increased its copper and iron ore mining 
ahead of the global average, its performance on the processing 
of copper, iron and aluminium is less stellar. Copper and 
steel production has been virtually stagnant since 1990, with 
aluminium production growing but lagging behind world 
production growth. It would be reasonable to expect Australia 
to lose market share to developing countries in labour intensive 
industries, but it is less reasonable to see reduced market 
shares in capital intensive industries with predominantly export 
outputs. Is Australia utilising its metal1 ores and other mineral 
resources to build a robust power economy?
Securing energy intensive industry investment however requires 
a reliable, affordable electricity backbone. As a developed 
country, Australia would be expected to satisfy this requirement 
but an analysis of other countries’ electricity backbones will  
provide clues as to the competitiveness or otherwise of 
Australia’s power economy.
2.1     CoMPAriNG AustrAliA’s eCoNoMiC  
 PerForMANCe to resourCe-riCh  
 CoMPetitors
To establish whether Australia’s economic resilience is a matter 
of luck or design, it is helpful to compare its performance 
over the last 18 years with countries that have similar natural 
resource wealth. We will compare the performance of Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, China, India, Russia2 , South Africa and the 
United States to understand how they have fared over the 
same period.  Whilst many countries experienced a rocky start 
2 tHe australian economy toDay
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FiGure 2: MetAls MiNiNG ANd ProCessiNG
Source: (USGS 2011)
tABle 1: ANNuAl GroWth iN MetAl reFiNiNG 1990-2008
Source: (USGS 2011)
Country   Bauxite iron ore Copper
Australia 2.6% 0.3% 0.2%
Brazil 3.3% 2.2% 1.0%
Canada 3.8% -0.3% -1.2%
Chile - 3.2% 0.8%
China 16.6% 11.3% 6.0%
india 6.3% 7.8% 5.8%
russia 1.0% -4.9% 0.1%
south Africa 9.8% -0.7% -1.7%
united states -2.3% -0.4% -1.9%
World 4.0% 2.5% 1.1%
 1 We look at metal ores rather than all mineral resources because we are comparing the performances of the energy-intensive metals processing sector
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to the 1990s, Brazil, India and Russia may have had higher 
levels of turmoil, but they have recovered to end the period with 
strong growth. China, India and Chile would appear to be the 
stand-out performers in the group, while Canada and the US 
lagged in 2008 as a result of the Global Financial Crisis. Export 
growth tracks consistently above each country’s GDP growth, 
underpinning GDP performance. 
A trend towards decreased labour intensity has not increased 
unemployment, but there has been a shift away from 
manufacturing (high employment) to mining (low employment) 
and the financial intermediation sector (medium employment). 
To illustrate, in 1990 1.2 million people (15% of the work force) 
were employed in the manufacturing sector earning revenue  
of AU$74 thousand per person ($2008), but that shrunk to  
1.1 million people (10% of the work force) and AU$99 thousand 
per person ($2008) in 2008. Conversely, mining employment 
has increased from 89,000 in 1990 (1% of the work force) 
to 133,000 in 2008 (still 1% of the work force) with a GDP 
contribution of AU$673 thousand per person ($2008).  
2 Russian data is based on the period from 1992 to 2008 due to lack of data for 1990 and 1991.
3 Employment by industry sector data is not available for China and India
Australia 3.4% 5.3%
Brazil 3.0% 7.3%
Canada 2.6% 4.5%
Chile 5.5% 7.8%
China 10.5% 18.3%
india 6.3% 12.0%
russia1 2.0% 4.5%
south Africa 2.9% 4.6%
united states 2.8% 5.8%
GdP Growth  export Growth
tABle 2: AverAGe yeArly GroWth (1990-2008)
Source: (IMF 2011)
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FiGure 3: GdP Per PersoN 1990 vs. 2008
Source: (UNData 2011)
By comparison Brazil, Chile and South Africa have increased 
their manufacturing employment while Russia and the US 
have decreased it although all countries3 (except Russia) show 
a trend to decreasing labour intensity, in particular a shift of 
employment away from agriculture. 
At US$47,890 per person in 2008, Australia has the highest 
GDP per capita of the competitor countries identified.  
This represents an annual increase of 2.1% since 1990.  
China’s GDP/person grew by 9.6% per annum, India’s by 
4.47%, Chile’s GDP by 4%, Brazil’s by 2.72% and Russia’s  
by 2.28% over the same period so Australia was at the lower 
end of GDP per capita growth. Competition from China and 
India, where GDPs/person are US$3,400 and US$1,070 
per person respectively, is fierce as they seek to win global 
production capacity through substantially lower labour costs. 
To remain competitive, Australia will need to offer technological 
superiority to counteract its higher labour costs.
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2.2     CoMPAriNG AustrAliA’s eNerGy  
 CoNsuMPtioN to resourCe-riCh  
 CoMPetitors
Australia has increased its demand for energy between 1990 
and 2008 from 5 to 6 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) per person 
per year which is more than 3 times higher than the average 
for the rest of the world. Brazil, Chile, China and India have all 
grown at more than that, but their demand remains substantially 
lower than Australia’s. All countries have reduced the energy 
intensity of their GDP but those reductions remain under 
whelming when compared to the average reduction by China, 
India and Russia4. 
Every country’s energy use reflects its historic inheritance in 
terms of local natural resources. However, some countries have 
experienced problems as a result of insufficient supply which 
have caused them to diversify and enhance their infrastructure 
for greater security of supply. 
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2.3 CoMPAriNG AustrAliA’s MetAl   
 resourCe utilisAtioN to resourCe- 
 riCh CoMPetitors 
When it comes to major metal deposits, Australia leads the 
world.  India and China have modest deposits of many of the 
metals, and yet, perhaps because they are starting from a low 
base, they have shown greater export growth over the period 
than more resource-rich countries like Australia. 
There are many reasons behind China and India’s apparent 
robust economic performance, but activity in the metals 
processing industries might provide an indicator of their 
economic management.  
The metals processing industry however requires substantial 
quantities of electricity at affordable prices. Australia considers 
itself fortunate to have deposits of coal which have underpinned 
a reliable, affordable electricity system. Metals processing 
consumed 24% of all electricity consumed in Australia in 1990 
and 27% in 2008. But what has happened to our competitors 
FiGure 4: eNerGy CoNsuMPtioN Per CAPitA
Source: (IEA 2010), (IEA 2010)
Australia 19% 17% 13% 12%
Brazil 12% 18% - 4%
Canada - 3% 1% 2%
Chile - - 24% 4%
China 3% 8% 5% 4%
india 3% 5% - -
russia 1% 16% 5% 11%
south Africa - 1% - 13%
united states - 2% 6% 6%
Country   Bauxite iron ore Copper Gold
tABle 3: shAre oF GloBAl MetAl dePosits
Source: (USGS 2011)
4  Russian data based on period from 1992 to 2008
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over the same period5? Canada and Russia increased metal 
processing consumption to 13% and 12% of all power 
consumed; Brazil, South Africa and the USA have decreased 
metal processing consumption as a percentage of total 
electricity consumed, partly because commercial and residential 
consumption have grown proportionately more than metals 
processing since 1990; and China increased metals processing 
consumption from 12% to 20% using 607TWh more in 2008 
than in 1990. That’s a voracious appetite for metals processing 
and power by a labour-intensive country still developing its 
power infrastructure.
In 1998 the Productivity Commission produced a report on the 
impact of microeconomic reform on the aluminium industry 
(Productivity Commission 1998). The report included the results 
from a survey of firms which indicated that environmental 
regulations including hazardous waste, air emissions, water 
emissions and land rehabilitation would have a negative impact 
on the industry (Productivity Commission 1998). A concern with 
environmental constraints would go some way to explaining the 
loss of market share to developing countries, but any business 
contemplating a long-term investment in a country would have 
to consider the risk of environmental constraints re-appearing 
as large developing economies mature. 
Despite the potential for environmental concerns, the oil shock 
of the 1970s and the prospect of a resources boom drove 
substantial investment in power infrastructure in Australia:  
Loy Yang in Victoria to service Alcoa’s aluminium plant at 
Portland; Eraring, Bayswater and Mt Piper to service the 
expected boom in New South Wales; Gladstone, Tarong and 
Callide to service Queensland’s projected requirements.  
Whilst the timing of those power stations may have initially 
resulted in excess capacity for the late 1980s and early 
1990s, they have serviced, and continue to service, the power 
economy well.  Although the public may have paid for at 
least some of that infrastructure by way of excess capacity 
and subsidised tariffs (Simshauser 2001), the benefit has 
been employment, investment and the funding of base-load 
power for the economy as a whole. Attracting resource-based 
investment to Australia has been good for the economy, 
increased employment and built an electricity backbone.
In summary, China is not only providing affordable labour 
resources for manufacturing, it is also building its electricity 
backbone for capital intensive industry based on Australian 
resources. Australia can either lose capital- and power-
intensive industries to developing countries where the power 
systems are still being developed or it can invest in a resilient, 
technologically advanced and competitive power economy 
that makes it logical to avoid the heavy costs of transporting 
ores across the globe. What would energy intensive industries 
require from the power economy to invest in Australia?
FiGure 5: GroWth iN eleCtriCity CoNsuMed For MetAls ProCessiNG
Source: (IEA 2010), (IEA 2010)
 5 Electricity industry consumption data for India and Chile is not available or unreliable.
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Resilience is the ability to withstand external shocks like 
interruptions to the supply of fuels, policy that might seek to 
reduce pollution, or unexpected surges in demand. Because of 
the fundamental importance of electricity to the economy, the 
electricity system must be resilient. Measuring the resilience 
of a power economy is complicated, however from a high 
level perspective, a resilient power economy should have a 
mix of fuel types that are able to withstand shocks from fuel 
supply or emission constraints, be efficient in producing power, 
provide security for the economy, and be affordable. To this 
end, quantifiable measurements of resilience in electricity 
supply are: the quantity of non-renewable fuel used; the 
quantity of emissions produced; the diversity of the type 
of fuel used; the efficiency of generation, transmission and 
distribution; the proportion of supply external to the country; 
the availability of electricity for use; and price. These high 
level measures allow concrete comparisons without having to 
understand the plethora of different policies pursued by each 
of the competitor countries. An overview of Australia’s power 
economy comparative6 resilience follows in which we develop 
a new overall measure that we call the Resilience Index which 
accounts for all these first order influences (see Appendix B: 
Building a Resilience Index for the power economy for more 
detail on the index).
3.1 eNerGy MiX iN PoWer GeNerAtioN
3.1.1 Non-renewable fuel used in generation 
In 2008, Australia used 284 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) 
non-renewable energy per Gigawatt hour (GWh) of electricity 
consumed which is higher than the world usage of 210 toe/
GWh. The usage of non-renewable energy has increased 
since 1990 when it was 258 toe/GWh. The Australian Bureau 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences 
(ABARES), points to an ageing power generation fleet with 
reducing efficiencies as  the probable cause of this increased 
usage (ABARES 2011). The increased usage also indicates a 
declining ability to withstand shocks from global non-renewable 
fuel shortages and substantial price increases in the event of 
constrained international supply.
Figure 6 provides a comparison of non-renewable fuel usage  
in electricity consumption between the competitor countries. 
3 tHe australian power economy toDay
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FiGure 7: NoN reNeWABle eNerGy use For eleCtriCity CoNsuMPtioN
Source: (IEA 2010)
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FiGure 6: GeNerAtioN MiX
Source: (IEA 2010), (IEA 2010)
6 We compare Australia to its resource rich competitors, but for reference purposes we have included OECD Europe.  Historically, OECD Europe has processed much of 
the world’s metal resources, and more recently it has invested heavily in diversifying its supply of power, so it serves as a useful reference point for power economies.
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The standout performer in the group would be Brazil where only 
39 toe are used per GWh consumed. Brazil has 85GW of hydro-
electric power which generates 80% of its electricity, providing 
considerable resilience to non-renewable fuel shocks. Canada 
and Chile generate 58% and 41% of their electricity from hydro-
electricity, also providing them with the ability to withstand 
non-renewable fuel shocks. To ensure reasonable comparisons 
between countries, heat generated for consumption from 
combined heat & power and pure heat plants has been 
converted to GWh to provide a notional total for electricity 
generation and consumption7. The IEA considers heat to be a 
very efficient form of energy (IEA 2011) and as a result Russia 
uses only 167 toe/GWh of power consumed. China has made 
efficiency improvements to its fleet of thermal generators which 
have reduced the average usage to 233 toe/GWh. Reliance on 
a high proportion of coal in electricity generation makes India, 
South Africa and Australia more vulnerable to non-renewable 
fuel price shocks.
3.1.2 Carbon intensity of generation
Australia has increased its emissions of carbon dioxide from 
electricity generation from 811g/KWh in 1990 to 882g/KWh 
in 2008 which is considerably more than the world average of 
500g/KWh in 2008. This reflects the increased fuel usage in the 
generation of electricity from coal as highlighted in Figure 8. 
As can be seen when comparing Figure 7 to Figure 8, countries 
that have a low use of non-renewable fuels logically have low 
carbon dioxide emissions from their electricity generation.  
These two indicators both measure the mix of generation but 
are included separately because a potential fuel constraint 
and a potential emission constraint would be two completely 
different shocks to the system.
3 tHe australian power economy toDay
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FiGure 8: Co2 eMissioNs FroM eleCtriCity GeNerAtioN
Source: (IEA 2010)
 7 This is particularly important for Russia, as two-thirds of their power consumption is in the form of heat rather than electricity. All power generation and consumption data 
in the paper include the notional adjustment to include heat power.
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3.1.3 diversity of Generation
The probability that the next watt of electricity will be generated 
from a different fuel type is a measure of diversity in the 
generation of electricity. Because of its high proportion of coal 
in the electricity mix, in 2008 the probability that the next watt 
would be from a different fuel type in Australia, was 0.39 (in 
1990 it was 0.37). This change reflects the increased proportion 
of gas, and the arrival of wind, into the energy mix. 
Where Brazil has an enviable supply of renewable electricity, its 
diversity of generation in 1990 was 0.14. The risk associated 
with a low diversity of generation was thrown into stark relief 
in 2001 when the Brazilian Government declared a major 
energy supply crisis as a result of a prolonged drought which 
severely depleted hydro-electric reservoir levels and threatened 
electricity supply. A power rationing program was instituted 
from May 2001 to February 2002 and consumption remained 
depressed until 2003 (IEA 2006). As a result Brazil has invested 
in natural gas generation which has increased diversity to 0.36. 
Australia too experienced reductions in electricity supply in 
2007 as a result of drought: Snowy Hydro became severely 
constrained and some coal-fired generation was scaled-back 
because of an inadequate supply of water.
South Africa is another country that has extremely low diversity 
of generation being almost entirely dependent on coal, with 
only 5% of generation from nuclear. What Australia and South 
Africa can learn from Brazil’s experience is that no matter 
how effective the supply of electricity may be, if there are few 
alternatives, the system is compromised. Australia needs to 
transition away from high reliance on fossil fuels to improve the 
diversity of its power economy.
3.2 eFFiCieNCy
3.2.1	 Generation	Efficiency
Australia’s efficiency in producing electricity (and heat) from 
coal, oil and gas in 2008 was 34% which was less than the 
world average of 42%. Australia’s generation efficiency has 
deteriorated from 36% in 1990 as a result of an ageing fleet.  
Figure 10 provides a comparison of the generation efficiency 
in producing electricity (and heat) from coal, oil and gas of the 
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FiGure 9: diversity oF GeNerAtioN
Source: (IEA 2010)
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FiGure 10: Fossil Fuel GeNerAtioN eFFiCieNCy
Source: (IEA 2010)
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competitor countries. All countries have improved the efficiency 
from fossil fuel generation over the 18 year period except 
Brazil, India, Russia and Australia. Russian generation is very 
efficient at 64% efficiency in 2008 because it recovers heat in 
the generation process to make the conversion to electricity 
more efficient. It also generates heat as a source of power 
which increases the efficiency of generation to 80-90% by 
eliminating losses in the conversion of energy. Australia could 
be missing efficiency benefits from recovering and using heat. 
There are many opportunities for recovering heat, particularly 
at the 5-10MW scale which could have a substantial impact on 
efficiency. China has seen improved efficiency from fossil fuel 
generation which reflects programs like the Large Substitute 
for Small Program, which are modernising and improving 
the efficiency of the fleet. India’s fossil fuel based generation 
efficiency at 27% would reflect the low gross coal plant 
efficiency in the Indian generation fleet (IEA 2011).
3.2.2	 Own	use,	transmission	and	distribution	efficiency
Australia has a landmass of 7.68 million km2, serviced by 
80,539 kms of transmission and 832,819kms of distribution 
2008   supply trans km dist km 
  mill km2 tWh (000s) (000s)
Aus           7.7  257 81 833
Bra           8.5  507 203 1582
Can           9.1  619 188 1162
Chile           0.7  61 16 119
China           9.3  3489 992 12100
ind           3.0  839 280 5674
rus         16.4  1021 510 2148
sA           1.2  252 28 626
usA           9.1  4378 1235 9645
tABle 4: lANdMAss, suPPly, trANsMissioN, distriButioN
Source: (ABS Energy Research 2010;  
IEA 2010; IEA 2010; World Bank 2011)
lines supporting generation of 55 GW and a supply of  
257 TWh. There is a complex relationship between geography,  
settlement, source of electricity supply and the transmission  
and distribution of that supply. Whilst Australia is a continent 
in its own right, it is smaller than the landmasses of Brazil, 
Canada, China, Russia and the USA. Australian load centres 
are very distant from each other with a large, low energy density 
rural load complicating the transmission and distribution 
infrastructure requirements. 
Chile has a particularly complex geography being only 175km 
at its widest point. India has a relatively small landmass with 
a very large population.  The complexities make comparison 
of the transmission and distribution complex, and yet there 
is a relationship between electricity supplied and geometry/
architecture of transmission and distribution lines.  It is 
interesting to note, that in 1990 Australia had 457km of 
transmission lines for every TWh supplied, whereas in 2008, 
this figure was 313km.  Some of the other countries have 
experienced similar declines except for Canada and Russia 
where there is very little decline and an increase, respectively. 
The average across the group in 2008 is 305km of transmission 
lines per TWh supplied. The data for distribution presents a 
similar picture. 
In terms of power system delivery efficiency, Australia loses 
some 18% of electricity between electricity generation and 
consumption: 7% is used by generators, 4% is used in mining 
and refining fuels and 7% is lost in transmission and distribution8. 
Comparing Australia’s transmission losses to the larger countries 
in Figure 12, we find that Brazil loses 15% through old and 
poorly maintained transmission and distribution systems with 
high losses and power theft, Canada loses 8% (including 
transmission for export to the USA), China loses 5%, and the 
USA loses 6%. Russia loses 8% through transmission and 
distribution, even though it sprawls across 11 time zones 
providing opportunities for spreading the impact of demand 
peaks and thus reducing generation requirements (IEA 2005).  
India’s losses are complex and multi-faceted including theft 
through illegal tapping, faulty meters, overloading distribution 
at peak demand and a very high ratio of low voltage to high 
voltage line kilometres (IEA 2011).
8 7% loss through transmission and distribution is thought to be lower than generally accepted losses. This could be as a result of the IEA reporting a total for the country 
including embedded generation which has no loss from transmission and distribution
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A lack of adequate investment in transmission has been blamed 
for, or implicated in, more than one severe failure in electricity 
supply in the competitor countries. The blackout in the USA 
in 2003 was blamed on inadequate adherence to reliability 
standards possibly as a result of reduced investment in the 
networks (IEA 2007). The electricity crisis in Brazil in 2001 after 
a sustained period of drought may have been exacerbated by 
old and poorly maintained transmission lines that were unable 
to reroute electricity from hydro-electric facilities less affected 
by the drought. The power shortages in China between 2002 
and 2005 may have been worsened by grid bottlenecks from 
limited transmission capacity between regional grids, weakness 
in transmission of bulk power at local levels, and weak 
interconnection. India continues to experience outages, not only 
as a result of transmission inadequacies but it is a part of the mix. 0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 a
n
d
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 lo
ss
es
FiGure 12: trANsMissioN ANd distriButioN losses 2008
Source: (IEA 2010), (IEA 2010)
         November 2011        15
3.3 seCurity
3.3.1 reliance on imports of fuels for electricity or actual  
 electricity imported
Being a rather large island with most of the fuel inputs for 
electricity generation locally available, Australia has no real 
security of supply issues. In 2008 Canada exported 58 TWh of 
electricity (9% of its generation) to the United States, and sees 
electricity as a valuable source of revenue. Russia and South 
Africa also export electricity to neighbouring countries although 
a smaller proportion than does Canada.  
On the other extreme, Chile imports coal and gas for its 
electricity generation and electricity from Argentina. There has 
been diversification from hydro power after a prolonged 40 
year drought reduced reservoir levels and resulted in outages 
and rations of electricity from 1998 to mid 1999. The move to 
gas has not been without its troubles as gas is imported from 
Argentina and that supply has been constrained since 2004. 
As a result Chile is constructing LNG terminals, in the hope of 
gaining security of import for gas for generation. 
India too has to import coal and gas for generation and 
electricity from Bhutan and Nepal. Coal imports are expensive 
for India but cheaper than transporting coal across the 
continent which can add $30/tonne to the price. With few 
resources to power the continent, Europe imports coal, gas 
and oil for generation and electricity from Russia. Brazil 
imports electricity from Paraguay and gas from Bolivia. Brazil 
too has sought to decrease its reliance on hydro-electricity by 
increasing its gas generation. However, Bolivia has run short 
of gas for its own requirements and all but ceased exports to 
Brazil, so Brazil is developing its gas fields to supply its gas 
generation. 
Australia’s security of supply is dependent on the continued use 
of fuels priced at domestic levels. In the event of substantial 
escalation of international prices, it will become increasingly 
difficult to maintain domestic prices and thus affordable 
electricity. And whilst certain coal deposits may be considered 
to be ‘stranded’ at current world prices, their potential for 
exploitation and sale will be affected by what other countries 
are prepared to pay for them. Thus, the strategic security of 
supply will decrease as global fuel prices rise.
3.3.2  redundant power for use in GdP
When countries experience electricity shortages, economic impacts 
are felt. It is with this in mind, that this indicator of redundancy 
is used as a measure of resilience; that is the spare capacity in the 
electricity system to fuel the economy. Unusually, this measure 
reflects positively for economies which have a high component 
of spare electricity capacity within GDP, and negatively for 
economies with a small amount of spare electricity for every 
dollar earned. This is because electricity will fuel growth and if 
electricity is squeezed, growth may be reduced.  
As can be seen from figure 14 Russia has a large quantity of 
spare capacity. Lenin is reputed to have said that Communism 
is “Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” 
Massive investment in electrification and free provision of 
utilities, led to very large consumption of power. However, 
the introduction of charges for the use of utilities after 1990 
has substantially reduced power consumption and increased 
efficiency.
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In 1990, South Africa had a high level of spare capacity, which 
had substantially declined by 2008 as a result of its failed 
market reforms (see section 4.4 for more detail). China also 
has a high component of spare capacity to fuel GDP. Studies 
have found unidirectional causality in China between electricity 
consumption and GDP over the periods 1971-2000 and 1978 
-2004 (Shiu and Lam 2004; Yuan, Zhao et al. 2007). So China’s 
high level of spare capacity has served its growth targets well.
 Chile’s experiences in 1999 provide an interesting and insightful 
example of the relationship between GDP growth and power 
system capacity. Over the 18 year period 1990 to 2008, the 
only year that Chile’s economy descended into recession was 
in 1999 after an hydro-electricity crisis in 1998 that followed 
40 years of drought.  Figure 15 shows GDP growth and TWh 
growth in Chile since 1990. The coupling of GDP growth to 
electricity growth appears to uncouple after the 2004 electricity 
crisis which followed restricted supply of gas from Argentina. 
This should be understood in the context of resilience measures 
adopted by Chile after 1999 which included a requirement 
for generators to have diesel-generated back-up units, and 
financial encouragement of industrial customers to install 
back-up diesel generation (IEA 2009). Chile’s experience 
with electricity supply constraints is a good illustration of the 
importance of having sufficient generation for economic needs.
As an energy source, electricity is effective, efficient and clean, 
and investment in electricity infrastructure should be planned 
to cover more than historical levels of consumption growth, 
allowing for the migration of all sectors of the economy to  
the use of electricity as the primary source of energy.  
As an example, the transportation sector offers the potential 
to migrate much of the asset base to electrification in the 
years to come; China has started the migration with fast rail 
links between cities. For this reason, economies will require 
increasing quantities of KWhs for every dollar of GDP earned, 
despite efficiencies gained through supply and demand 
management. With a requirement to increase consumption of 
electricity in different sectors of the economy, efficiency will  
be critical to optimise investment in the power infrastructure. 
resilience and the power economies
In the previous sections Australia has been compared to 
other countries on quantifiable measurements of resilience in 
electricity supply. In summarising, the following observations 
can be made about the Australian power economy:
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 • It uses more fossil fuels in the generation of every KWh  
  than the world average, making it vulnerable to global  
  energy price increases. Only India and South Africa use  
  more fossil fuels in generation. 
 • It emits more carbon dioxide emissions in the generation  
  of every KWh than the world average, making it   
  vulnerable to carbon emission mitigation policies.  
  Only India emits more carbon dioxide from generation. 
 • It has a low diversity of generation, making it vulnerable  
  to energy supply constraints. Brazil, China and South  
  Africa have lower diversity of generation. 
 • Its efficiency in generating power from fossil fuels is  
  lower than the world average, with only India less efficient  
  in generating power from fossil fuels. 
 • Its transmission and distribution system is more efficient  
  than the world average, with only China, USA and OECD  
  Europe having more efficient distribution systems. 
 • It has little reliance on imports for the generation of  
  electricity and no reliance on imported electricity, making  
  it secure from external supply disruptions, although this  
  security will be impacted as global fuel prices rise. 
 • Unlike China, Russia and the USA, Australia has low levels of 
  spare capacity to fuel GDP which could indicate an inability  
  to service unplanned growth in electricity requirements.
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Whilst there was a small improvement in the US/AUS exchange 
rate between 1990 and 2008 there was a substantial 
deterioration in the rate from 1998 to 2003 when electricity 
would have been considerably cheaper relative to world 
prices. Comparing prices in US$ therefore to some extent 
masks domestic trends but global firms will look to the price of 
electricity in US$ to establish competitiveness, as profits will  
be reported in US$. For this reason, 2008 prices are compared 
to 1990 real prices at the 2008 exchange rate.
Figure 17 provides a summary of the weighted average national  
price of electricity to industry for Australia’s resource-rich  
competitors. The source of most of the data, the IEA, recommends 
caution with respect to data quality. Despite this the comparative 
data provides an indication of how energy-intensive firms may 
view the Australian power economy viz-a-viz other  
resource-rich countries. 
Prices for electricity in Russia have soared from a negligible 
price in 1990, reflecting Russia’s moves to monetize utilities and 
reform the electricity sector by creating competitive wholesale 
and retail sectors. Chile and Brazil have also experienced 
3.4   Cost oF eleCtriCity to iNdustry
With the de-regulation of much of Australia’s electricity system 
in 1998, data pertaining to costs, investments and prices 
has not been collected nationally. ABARES calculate country 
aggregated price based on IEA estimations from 2004 
extrapolated using Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
electricity price indices. Indeed IEA estimations are subject  
to substantial variations in the historical data which the IEA  
state is as a result of switching between several sources.   
For the purposes of this paper, the price of electricity to  
industry has been calculated using 1990 as a base year  
(when a weighted average national price was readily available 
through the Electricity Supply Association of Australia, ESAA) 
and extrapolated to 2008 using the ABS Producer Price  
Index or electricity.  
Figure 16 shows relatively flat nominal weighted average 
national electricity prices for industry in Australia between  
1990 and 2007, with a sharp increase in 2008. However,  
if the prices are adjusted for inflation, then there is a fall in 
prices between 1990 and 2008.
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sharp increases in electricity price having had to contend with 
electricity rationing during droughts, currency turmoil and  
inflation as a result of uncertainties regarding gas supplies from 
Argentina and Bolivia. Also, the IEA reports that 40% of the 
average Brazilian electricity bill is for taxes and special charges 
to cover the cost of extending electrification to all households 
(IEA 2006). Europe has experienced an increase in prices 
but has diversified the supply and decreased the emissions 
intensity of its electricity supply. China is starting to experience 
rises in price which may accelerate if coal cost increases and 
massive investment in electricity infrastructure start to be 
passed through to customers. 
Australia, India, South Africa and the US prices have been 
relatively stable or even decreasing with little change to their 
generation mix and efficiency. By comparison, South America 
has had to respond to fuel supply constraints and Europe has 
been responding to the risk of future carbon constraints.  
For instance whilst Australia has increased its carbon intensity 
from 811g/KWh in 1990 to 882g/KWh in 2008, OECD Europe 
has decreased its carbon intensity from 431g/KWh to  
328g/KWh. South America and Europe may be better prepared 
for future uncertainties regarding fuel costs and carbon  
constraints as a result of their experiences over the last 18 
years. Canada has invested in its natural resources to deliver 
low-cost, diversified and affordable electricity despite its 
largely regulated power system (generation is deregulated in 
Alberta, and is subject to contract guarantees and fixed prices 
in Ontario and fully regulated in all other provinces). Reflecting 
the competitiveness of its power to industry, it has maintained 
its market share of aluminium smelting even though it has no 
deposits of the metal in the country. Notably, Australia and 
the US’s reduced real price of electricity to industry, has not 
resulted in a marked increase in energy-intensive electricity 
consumption.
3.5  CoMPetitiveNess oF the PoWer  
   eCoNoMies
How resilient a power economy is, will dictate how prepared it is 
to meet challenges and opportunities, and its future potential to 
compete. Non-renewable fuel used, carbon intensity, diversity 
of fuel type, efficiency in generation, efficiency in supply from 
generation to consumption, reliance on imports and spare 
electricity capacity (the measures mentioned above) have 
been incorporated into a composite index, called the Power 
Economy Resilience Index. As all the indicators are viewed as 
equally important in measuring an electricity system’s resilience, 
so they have not been weighted (more detail is provided in 
Appendix: Building a Resilience Index for the power economy)
Effectively the Power Economy Resilience Index measures 
the quality of the power production system, and coupled 
with the price of the service provided, allows measurement 
of the competitiveness of the power economy. Plotting the 
Resilience Index as a function of the average cost of electricity 
to industry provides a simple graphical representation of the 
competitiveness of the power economies. 
With reference to Figure 18, it appears reasonable to draw the 
following conclusions: 
 • Russia has the most competitive power economy   
  from amongst the competitor countries. Unlike   
  much of the rest of the world, it has not invested heavily  
  in coal-fired generation and has a large and reliable  
  supply of gas to meet its generation needs. Russia  
  has also gained efficiency benefits from using heat as  
20         Part 1: Australia’s global position
 • It would seem that Australia’s power system today is  
  neither very resilient nor competitively priced. 
There are a few interesting comparisons to consider. The first is 
that Russia offers the most competitive power economy from 
a largely non-competitive institutional structure, compared to 
Chile which offers resilience, but at a cost, from a competitive 
market structure. The second is that the USA and China have 
similar levels of competitiveness but have fundamentally 
different market and institutional structures. Whilst Canada 
and Russia have similarly affordable, (largely) publicly owned 
electricity systems in large, cold landmasses, their generating 
fleets are vastly different with Canada gaining its resilience 
from hydro-electricity and Russia gaining its resilience from 
  a source of power. However, Russia’s power infrastructure  
  is aged and in need of renewal (IEA 2005).  
 • Canada also offers a competitive power economy.   
  It has increased resilience from fossil fuel price spikes and  
  supply uncertainty and it has achieved that resilience at  
  very affordable prices.  
 • The USA too offers a competitive power economy   
  because it has a diverse supply of electricity coupled with  
  reasonable levels of capacity to fuel the economy. 
 • Chile and OECD Europe are resilient but their cost reduces  
  their competitiveness.  
 • South Africa offers the most competitively priced electricity  
  system amongst the group, but it comes with resilience  
  warnings for any investor.  
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gas generation and efficient use of heat as power. It would 
seem that there is more than one path to competitive resilience. 
Which is the best path for Australia to follow to improve its 
competitive resilience?
In order to validate the competitiveness of each power 
economy, Figure 19 offers further evidence of each country’s 
ability to attract energy-intensive industry. Global market share 
gap is defined as the difference between the global market 
share of the metal mined and the global market share of the 
metal processed. For example in 2009, Australia mined 33% 
of global bauxite but processed 5% of the world’s aluminium, 
allowing a market share gap of 28% for aluminium processing.  
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Countries that process more of a metal than they mine could 
then be assumed to be attractive to metals processing 
investors. Figure 19 shows that Canada, Russia, China and the 
USA process more aluminium than they mine, which supports 
the findings presented in Figure 18 that those countries offer 
competitive power economies. Brazil and Chile have substantial 
market share gaps which bears out the findings that they 
are reasonably resilient but expensive. India shows a lack of 
competitiveness with only copper producing a negative market 
share gap. South Africa shows a negative market share gap 
for aluminium which reflects its low price. Australia shows little 
evidence of ability to attract energy-intensive industry.
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Using the same source of data, the IEA, for the resilience index 
calculation and the weighted average price of electricity to 
industry it is relevant to understand the direction of change from 
1990 to 2008, assuming the same methodology. 
Figure 20 provides a summary of the relative competitiveness 
of each country in 1990 and the shift in competitiveness to 
2008. Russia’s apparent reduced resilience should be treated 
with caution due to Russian data quality issues in 1990, 
however it can be noted that the monetisation of utilities has 
brought Russian power prices more into line with the rest of the 
competitor countries. Most countries have achieved modest 
increases in resilience at an average annual price increase of 
less than 2% except for Brazil, China and Chile where the price 
increase was 2.7%, 3.4% and 5.7% respectively.  
The USA improved its resilience through improved generation, 
transmission and distribution efficiency as well as improved 
diversity whilst also reducing the price. Chile’s loss of resilience 
is due to its increased dependence on imported sources for 
electricity, India’s loss of resilience is due to its decrease in 
efficiency of generation coupled with increased dependence  
on imported sources for electricity, and Australia’s reduced 
price has come at the cost of resilience as a result of generation 
efficiency deteriorations. 
The competitiveness of the power economy, that is the 
combination of both resilience and price to reflect value, is 
driven by a multiplicity of factors, a subset of which is examined 
in more detail in the following sections.
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 9 This has subsequently been amended into two schemes to account for the high deployment of small-scale and domestic generation. The target for medium and  
large-scale generation has been reduced to 41,000GWh by 2020.
Fe
ed
-in
 ta
rif
f (
in
cl
. 
Pr
em
iu
m
 p
ay
m
en
t)
El
ec
tr
ic
 u
til
ity
 q
uo
ta
 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
/ R
PS
N
et
 m
et
er
in
g
Bi
of
ue
ls 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
/ 
m
an
da
te
He
at
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
/ 
m
an
da
ta
Tr
ad
ab
le
 R
EC
Ca
pi
ta
l s
ub
sid
y,
 g
ra
nt
 
or
 re
ba
te
In
ve
st
m
en
t o
r 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ta
x 
cr
ed
its
Re
du
ca
tio
ns
 in
 sa
le
s,
 
en
er
gy
, C
O
2,
 V
AR
 o
r 
ot
he
r t
ax
es
En
er
gy
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pa
ym
en
t
Pu
bl
ic
 in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
lo
an
s o
r g
ra
nt
s
Pu
bl
ic
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
bi
dd
in
g
Australia ▲ ▲ ● ● ●
Brazil ● ● ● ●
Canada ▲ ▲ ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Chile ● ● ● ●
China ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Germany ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
India ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Russia ● ●
South Africa ● ● ● ●
Spain ● ● ● ▲ ● ● ●
UK ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
United States ▲ ▲ ▲ ● ▲ ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
REGULATORY POLICIES FISCAL INCENTIVES
PUBLIC 
FINANCING
National ●
State ▲
FiGure 21: reNeWABle eNerGy suPPort PoliCies
Source: (REN21 2011)
4.1 PoliCy eNviroNMeNt
Energy policy in Australia is complex and dynamic, but it is  
important to highlight the first order issues that occupy the  
mainstream agenda and will affect the medium term implementation  
of market reform and the transition to a different power economy.
Carbon lock-in inhibits or delays the inevitable action needed 
to transition to less carbon intensive fuel sources (Unruh 2000; 
Unruh 2002; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006). Australian 
energy policy, like many developed countries, favours existing 
sources of generation with significant inertia to change as a 
result of multiple economic and social factors.
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Australia’s Renewable Energy Target (RET) requires that twenty 
percent of generation be met through renewable energy sources 
by 2020 (now quantified at 45,000GWh ). This policy was 
part of a double policy measure which required an emissions 
trading scheme to increase the cost of existing high-emission 
generation relative to low-emission generation. The government 
of the day was unable to pass the emissions trading scheme, 
which came to be known as the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme, into law so the RET remains as the only source of 
incentive for investment in low-emission generation.   
The inability to introduce a carbon price into the Australian 
economy has increased uncertainty for strategic investment in 
generation.
The government commenced preparation of an Energy 
White Paper in 2008 to set a policy framework for “a secure, 
competitive, efficient and sustainable energy sector” 
(Department of Resources Energy and Tourism 2011). A draft 
of this paper is expected in 2011 with the paper to be finalised 
in 2012. Questions remain as to whether this will allow time for 
planning and construction of large-scale renewable generation 
to meet the ambitious renewable energy targets for 2020.
Future base-load renewable generation is a challenge for 
network connection and operation. Current policy requires 
that all costs relating to connection (and where required, grid 
upgrades) be met by the new generator. With potential base-
load renewable generation (eg geothermal and concentrated 
solar thermal with storage) located considerable distances from 
existing grid infrastructure, the cost of connection is proving 
to be a barrier to entry. A recent Australian Energy Market 
Operator report, which considered transmission needs for 
the next twenty years, found it was not economically viable 
to include infrastructure requirements for remote renewable 
energy resources (AEMO 2010). Access to remote locations for 
renewable energy is not a new problem for network operators.  
Hydro-electricity has been driving investment in high volume 
transmission infrastructure around the world since 1965 
(Lings 2005). The question for policy makers is what changes 
are required to existing policy to facilitate access to remote 
base-load renewable energy generation?
Distributed generation presents a significant opportunity to 
shave peak load, but it will not contribute significantly to the 
overall need for large-scale generation in the foreseeable future.
The central priority for Australian policy makers should be the 
identification of policies that will ensure the competitiveness 
of Australian large power users. Figure 21 provides a summary 
of the policies implemented by Australia and its competitors. 
Canada, China, India and the US would appear to have the 
most comprehensive range of policies implemented. 
4.2  reGulAtory/iNstitutioNAl   
   FrAMeWorK
Australia has three distinct regulatory environments.  
The largest, the National Electricity Market, provides a 
deregulated electricity system, which can be broken down 
into four key sectors: generation; transmission; distribution; 
and retail sales. Most retail sales entities are privately owned 
but there is a significant mix in ownership structure controlling 
generation, transmission and distribution.
The current regulatory regime was put in place in 1998 and 
since 2006 has been controlled by the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER), which is responsible for the wholesale 
electricity and gas markets as well as all transmission and 
distribution regulations. There have been significant increases 
in the price of electricity since that time, primarily due to the 
high cost of investment in distribution networks. There has been 
criticism of the current rules for distribution networks, which 
have been designed to encourage investment from the private 
sector but, in effect, have the potential to provide additional 
profits to Government owned corporations through  
over-investment in infrastructure (Garnaut 2011). 
The electricity market is operated by the Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO). Any changes to market rules are 
administered by the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) with the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) having 
overall responsibility for policy oversight of the Australian 
energy market. It is intended that the rules will be reviewed  
in 2011 as part of the regulatory process.
There are 28 utilities in Australia with new emerging structures 
like Independent Power Producers (IPPs) which provide 
renewable energy and peaking power but also privately owned 
small scale PV facilities.
Western Australia and the Northern Territories are the two 
smaller regulatory environments. They both have an entirely 
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separate and independent institutional framework, due 
to their geographic location.  In the Northern Territories, 
electricity is supplied primarily by Power and Water, a state 
owned corporation, but private ownership of generation and 
distribution facilities is permitted. In Western Australia, a 
Wholesale Electricity Market was established in 2006 with 
generation separated from networks and retail, regulated by  
the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA). 
The history of state-based power system development created 
a high number of generators, transmitters, distributors and 
retailers even though in recent times there have been efforts 
to increase the concentration through cross acquisition and 
mergers. This state-centric development has led to fragmented 
policy with little national oversight and planning. As an example 
Queensland was originally an isolated grid for a relatively small 
population. It had 1 transmitter, and a number of generation 
companies, retailers and distribution companies, suggesting 
that these utilities are small and experience limited benefits 
from economies of scale and critical mass. State based 
Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs) are a good example of fragmented policy 
development for the Australian power economy. States have 
each offered different FiTs which have driven investment in 
renewable energy but not necessarily the optimum type or level 
of investment. If the Australian power economy continues to 
evolve through bottoms up regional target setting, rather than a 
more national, top-down, strategic planning process, it will not 
be able to reap the benefits from long-term strategic planning.
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4.3 eleCtriCity deMANd ANd loAd   
  ProFile
Major demand drivers are:
 • Rising living standards and increased GDP 
 • Population change 
 • Change of electricity use (electrification of energy- 
  intensive industries, consumer behaviour, electrification  
  of transportation, electrification of fuel production)
Major Load Profile drivers are:
 • Behaviour of residential consumers (technology,   
  particularly  home entertainment systems, are a major  
  factor currently) 
 • Climatic conditions (air conditioning, heating) 
 • Presence of capital and energy intensive industries
Australian electricity consumption has grown by 2.7% per 
annum since 1990. Population growth of 1.3% per annum 
has driven a portion of that 2.7% increase, but other 
major contributors have been: metals processing industry 
consumption which has grown by 3.6% per annum since 1990, 
adding 0.7% per annum growth to electricity consumption; 
commercial and public service consumption has grown by 
3.9% per annum, which increased overall consumption growth 
by 0.8%; and residential consumption, has grown by 2.3% 
contributing 0.4% to overall consumption growth. 
The growth in metals processing consumption is confirmation 
that Australian power remains competitive globally, but an 
international mining company’s recent decision to close its 
refining operations (ABC 2011) could foreshadow an exodus 
of metals processing operations, if Australia does not get 
the efficiency/resilience mix right. An increase in commercial 
consumption is to be expected since the Financial Intermediation 
sector, a major contributor to the commercial sector, has 
increased employment by 3.1% per annum and made a GDP 
contribution of 4.6% per annum since 1990. Residential sector 
electricity consumption has been driven by increasing house 
sizes, decreasing electric appliance costs and affordable 
electricity tariffs which have created not only a “Boomerang 
Paradox” where low income earners become trapped by 
increasing electricity prices (Simshauser, Nelson et al. 2010) 
but also resistance to any carbon mitigation policy that might 
impact on electricity prices (Hanson 2011).
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FiGure 23: AustrAliAN eleCtriCity CoNsuMPtioN 1960 to 2010
Source: (ABARES 2011)
Figure 24 provides further detail of state energy projections to 
2020 showing an inexorable march upwards. Figure 25 provides 
the state projections for peak load through to 2020 showing a 
steeper increase than the energy projections.
Figure 26 provides a comparison of the growth in consumption 
and the growth in generation plant installed. Generation 
capacity has increased by 1.9% per annum since 1990, which 
is significantly less than the 2.6% annual increase in electricity 
generated. The projected increase in generation capacity of 
2.6% per annum to 2020 reflects the increased proportion of 
wind in the mix with a capacity factor of less than 35% and 
an increase in peak demand over-and-above average load 
between 2008 and 2020 will contribute substantially to an 
increased requirement for peaking generation capacity.
The management of demand is still in very early stages in 
Australia. As a result, the growth in peak demand must be 
serviced by increasing levels of generation and transmission 
infrastructure. This will continue to weigh heavily on electricity 
tariffs and affect the competitiveness of Australian electricity 
for the large industrial users unless measures are taken to 
address energy efficiency, energy conservation and demand 
management more aggressively.
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4.4 CAPACity utilisAtioN oF GeNerAtioN
As Australia has increased generation capacity by only 1.9% 
per annum since 1990, it is pertinent to understand how 
effectively the generation fleet is being utilised.  For this 
purpose, it is assumed that renewable technologies are always 
at their intrinsic full capacity, so the analysis includes only coal, 
oil, gas and nuclear generation. 
Figure 27 shows that in 1990 Australian generation provided 
53% capacity utilisation, but that by 2008 that had increased to 
62%. The US and OECD Europe had capacity utilisation factors 
of 49% and 55% respectively in 2008. The  only countries that 
had greater efficiency of generation than Australia were South 
Africa and India, but South Africa’s reserve margin slipped 
below 5% in 2008 resulting in mandatory load shedding and  
by 2010 Indian supply shortages were estimated at 10%  
(IEA 2011), so there would appear to be  certain risks associated 
with aggressive utilisation of capacity.
South Africa’s lack of investment in generation is a stark 
warning of the consequences of failing to carry out market 
reforms effectively and as a result invest adequately. In an 
attempt to decrease South Africa’s public utility, ESKOM’s, 
monopoly of the market, the government required that 30% of 
generation come from independent power producers (IPPs). 
However, due to the low price of electricity in South Africa, 
no IPPs stepped forward and there was no investment in 
generation. Whilst consumption kept growing, only in 2004 
did the government policy on IPPs change and ESKOM was 
instructed to increase capacity. Due to the time constraints 
in delivering generating units, the reserve margin decreased 
to 6% and in 2006 mandatory load shedding started and 
was to continue until 2008 when a national electricity crisis 
was declared. By 2008 the reserve margin was below 5% 
which created peripheral problems like deteriorating plant 
performance due to rushed maintenance and higher than 
normal capacity levels. South Africa plans to have new capacity 
commissioned between 2012 and 2017 and hopes to see its 
electricity system challenges recede after 2012 (ESKOM 2008). 
With South Africa’s generation capacity woes since 2006, it is 
interesting to note that it has still managed GDP growth of 5.6% 
in 2007 and 3.6% in 2008. What might its growth have been, 
had it not been constrained by rolling blackouts?
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4.5 PoWer At CAll 
The provision of flexible power in Australia is:-
 • Provided through state based peaking plants; 
 • Mostly gas fired, but costly and offers no storage  
  capability; 
 • Or fast reacting coal-fired power stations; 
 • Little power storage in the form of hydro pump storage  
  facilities; 
 • Largely confined to individual states, for instance 
  Queensland has only been interconnected with New  
  South Wales since 2006; 
 • Therefore flexible power in Queensland could be  
  vulnerable to international gas price increases.
Future requirements for flexible power in Australia
 • More flexible power will be required to service 
  o More intermittent power generation 
  o Peak load growth over and above average load 
  o Electrification of transport (Electric vehicles and  
   public transport)
30         Part 1: Australia’s global position
4.6  iNvestMeNt iN PoWer iNFrAstruCture
To service electricity consumption growth of 64% since 1990, 
Australia has increased its generation capacity by 47%, its 
transmission lines by 14% and its distribution lines by 19%.  
By comparison, the US has met its 45% growth in consumption 
by increasing its generation capacity by 45%, transmission  
lines by 22% and distribution lines by 32% since 1990.  
Canada has increased its transmission and distribution capacity 
by 26% and 25% respectively, reflecting its use of the grid for 
electricity inter-regional trading. As an example, Canada buys 
up cheap power (often coal fuelled) at off-peak and sells hydro 
power at peak, within the country and across the border to 
the US. Chile’s three-fold increase in generation and massive 
investment in transmission and distribution is all the more 
remarkable for having been financed and built almost entirely  
by the private sector. 
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China’s investment is nothing short of astonishing. To service 
consumption growth of 477% it has increased its generation 
capacity by 464% and more than doubled its transmission 
and distribution lines; and yet it might have been even better. 
Because of perceived excess capacity in 1999, the government 
declared a moratorium on new capacity which was only lifted in 
2002. This translated into power shortages from 2002 through 
to 2005, including planned power outages to industry, and 
enforced change of operating hours (in some cases firms were 
restricted to working three to four days a week, or only at night). 
The power shortages led to significant economic losses from 
supply disruptions. 
In summary, investment in the power economy is essential to 
increasing or maintaining efficiency and resilience. China has 
invested massively in its power economy since 1990 to support 
its burgeoning industrial base. At the other extreme, an attempt 
at market reform in South Africa resulted in a lack of investment 
and a national electricity crisis. It is important to get investment 
levels right.
FiGure 28: PoWer systeM iNvestMeNt
Source: (IEA 2010), (ABS Energy Research 2010)
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4.7 trANsMissioN
Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) transmission 
network has the longest alternating current (AC) transmission 
system in the world, supplying 200,000 GWh p.a. over the 40,000 
kilometres of transmission line with its network extending 5000km 
from Far North Queensland to South Australia and Tasmania. 
In comparison to European, Asian and North American 
transmission networks, the NEM is considered predominantly  
a radial type of system than meshed (AEMO 2010).   
The NEM transmission network has originally evolved from 
the joining of state based transmission networks, originally 
designed and constructed independently in the past to meet 
the supply needs within each state. As a result, the primary 
transmission voltage for each state is varied and inconsistent 
from state to state. For example, as of 30th June 2009, the 
Queensland network, being one the longest networks and 
the largest land mass in comparison to other states, has a 
275kV primary backbone with limited 330kV and long 132kV 
transmission lines; while Victoria, having the smallest land  
mass and the most meshed network within the NEM, has a 
500kV primary backbone with some 330kV and long 220kV 
networks. In between Victoria and Queensland, NSW and ACT 
has 330kV as the primary backbone with limited 500kV systems 
and long 132kV networks. The transmission distance of each 
voltage level in Victoria, Queensland, NSW and ACT is depicted 
in Figure 29 (ESAA 2010).
Australia’s long distance transmission networks are primarily 
overhead and the NEM has very limited high voltage DC 
network systems. The longest high voltage DC network in 
the NEM is Basslink, which connects Victoria to Tasmania to 
transmit 600 MW of power through a 300km, 400 kV undersea / 
underground/overhead link.
In comparison to China, USA and Canada’s, transmission 
networks :-
All three countries have an AC primary backbone at voltage 
greater than 400kV. 
China has a primary backbone transmission system of 500kV 
with almost 22,400 km lines to connect most inter-provincial 
grids (Zhou). USA has 55,480 circuit km of transmission 
systems for 400-599 kV AC systems and 15,000 circuit km of 
transmissions systems at 600-800 kV AC systems (NERC 2009). 
Hydro-Québec in Canada maintains over 32,000 kilometres of 
transmission lines, with its AC 735/765 kV power lines as the 
main backbone of the entire transmission system. 
All three countries have long extensive high voltage DC (HVDC) 
networks for system security. China has recently installed 660kV 
HVDC transmission system to transmit 4000 MW of electricity 
over a distance of 1,333 km (Xinhua Economic News 2011). 
Large scale power transmission through HVDC has been 
operational in the US and Canada for many years at 500 kV 
level, e.g. Pacific DC Intertie between Oregon to California 
to transmit 3000 MW of power for 1350 km, Nelson river 
HVDC Bipole 1 in Canada links 895 km at ±450 kilovolts from 
Radisson to Dorsey to transmit maximum power of 1620MW, 
and Bipole 2 connects through 937 km of ±500 kV line from 
Henday to Dorsey transferring a maximum power of 1800 MW.
From a global scale there is concern with the transmission 
investment per annum growths. In most countries around the 
world transmission investment is much lower compared to the 
generation investment growths. As shown in Figure 30 from 1990 
to 2008, there is significantly lower growth in the transmission 
network in Australia compared to its competitor countries.
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the mainland regions, and 400 kV high-voltage direct current 
(HVDC) connections between Tasmania and the mainland. 
The NEMLink project represents AEMO’s study of potential 
extension of existing and planned regional transmission 
networks (AEMO 2010). The shortcoming of this viewpoint is 
that there is no planned expansion HVDC into transmission 
system and that there is still some degree of uncertainty to their 
model. However despite the uncertainty in the proposed 
NEMLink model, it demonstrates the importance of 
comprehensive research required towards future transmission 
expansion in the NEM to meet the future demand growth.
Overall it is imperative that the future expansion of the AC 
transmission system should be at a higher voltage level than it 
is currently throughout the NEM. For long distance transmission 
system optimised voltage level plays an important role to 
significantly reduce system loss and making the NEM more efficient 
and reliable. More long distance HVDC lines should also be 
considered as part of the overall expansion strategy as it can 
provide significant improvements in power system security to 
meet the future growth in electricity, in particular to transmit 
electricity from remotely located, renewable energy based 
power plants such as wind, solar-thermal and geothermal.  
In the next 20 years significant capital investment is required 
not only to deal with expansion, but also maintain the status 
quo of the current energy demands in the transmission system.   
4.8 CoNsuMPtioN eFFiCieNCy
“Investing in energy efficiency is often cleaner, cheaper, safer, 
faster and more reliable than investing in new supply”  
(IEA 2006). Others see energy efficiency as a “transition fuel” 
bridging the gap to new technologies. But companies in 
competitive generation markets strive for an increase in profit 
and revenue and therefore are focussed on maximising output. 
Government incentives to increase efficiency despite low cost 
primary energy and low cost electricity remain a requirement. 
Demand-Side Management provides a managed approach 
to support balanced load profiles and efficiency. However, 
low primary energy cost will continue to limit any action on 
efficiency measures. 
Currently the Energy Efficiency Industry in Australia is immature 
and not well supported, although Low Carbon Australia and 
other publicly driven initiatives are an early start in this direction. 
According to Low Carbon Australia there is an efficiency 
improvement potential on the consumption side (residential, 
commercial and industrial) of 30% or more.
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In conjunction with global low transmission investment growth, 
ageing transmission infrastructure is another concern.   
Many countries around the world developed their transmission 
infrastructures during 60’s, 70’s and 80’s. According to the  
U.S. Department of Energy, 70% of the transmission lines  
and transformers in the US in 2006 were 25 years or older 
(Fitch Ratings 2006). A similar situation is evident globally and in 
Australia, where in 2000, 50% of substation transformers were 
older than 25 years (Allan 2004).     
In 2010 Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) conducted 
comprehensive scenario based transmission expansion studies 
(optimised generation and transmission modelling) to fulfil 
the growth of electricity by 2030. These scenarios include 
carbon price volatility, inclusion of base load gas-powered and 
coal fired generation (with and without carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) technology), new wind and geothermal 
generations, new conventional CCGT generation with and 
without significant retirement of brown coal and (to a lesser 
extent) black coal generation. Based on different scenarios, 
different levels of reinforcement of the existing network is 
required to deliver gas-powered and coal-fired conventional 
generation in existing locations, and remotely located new 
renewable generation, to the major load centres (AEMO 2010).
AEMO has also introduced and studied a conceptual project 
called NEMLink, to significantly increase power transfer 
capabilities in the NEM from South Australia and Tasmania to 
Queensland. The NEMLink proposal considered high capacity 
500 kV double circuit, AC transmission backbone connecting 
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4.9 Cost drivers
There are three major factors that have influenced the cost 
of electricity between 1990 and 2008. Firstly, Australia has 
a plentiful supply of thermal coal for electricity generation. 
Whilst consumption of fuels by generators in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) has increased by an annual average 
of 3%, the weighted average cost of those fuels has increased 
from $11.91/MWh to an estimated $12.75/MWh in 2008/09. 
If adjusted for inflation, the weighted average cost of fuel 
has decreased by an average of 2.2% per annum. During the 
same period, the thermal coal export values increased from 
$49 to $109.75 per ton (ABARES 1999; ABARES 2009) which 
translates to a real price increase of 1.9% per annum. Figure 31 
provides a summary of the use and cost of fuel in the NEM from 
1990 to 2008.
Keeping fuel costs low for local electricity generation has been 
possible because of a combination of coal mine ownership by 
generators, long term contracts with mines that reflect lower 
thermal coal prices and ‘stranded’ resources, that is resources 
unable to be exported because of lack of infrastructure or 
demand for low quality coal. Figure 32 provides an overview 
of coal and gas export values compared to the calculated 
weighted average national electricity fuel cost. 
 
New South Wales is already starting to experience the impact  
of increasing global energy prices, with overnight prices for 
coal-fired generation now clearing at $25/MWh instead of  
$15/MWh in previous years. Queensland on the other hand, 
remains inured to increasing global energy prices due to low 
quality coal used in generation.
The general consensus is that generators will seek to fend 
off international price impacts. Whilst gas generators will be 
affected once existing contracts expire and infrastructure 
facilitates gas exports, it is considered unlikely that coal 
generators will be affected by a steep increase in international 
coal prices. Examples like the formation of an unincorporated 
joint venture to develop new mines in NSW to hedge against 
export parity prices are cited as evidence that generators will 
be able to continue to secure fuel at cheap domestic rates 
(IES 2011). Figure 33 provides an example of the generation 
costs as modelled by Intelligent Energy Systems (IES) for the 
Energy White Paper for three power plants, namely: Callide a 
coal fired plant; Tallawarra, a combined cycle gas fired plant; 
and Braemar, an open cycle gas fired plant. Callide’s coal input 
costs are assumed to stay at domestic prices ensuring that 
generation cost remains at current levels into the foreseeable 
future. Braemar and Tallawarra’s gas input costs are assumed 
to increase initially as long-term contracts expire and then to 
match international prices. The increased cost of gas-fired 
electricity will put pressure on end-user prices and substantially 
advantage coal generators over gas generators. If these 
projections are correct, the higher cost of gas-fired generation 
and the design of the electricity market will encourage 
generation from coal-fired generation over gas-fired generation, 
continuing the trend experienced from 1990 to 2008 of 
favouring lower cost, less efficient, higher emission generation 
over high cost, more efficient, lower emission generation.
The second major influence on the Australian power system has 
been deregulation. As a consequence the National Electricity 
Market has focused on low-cost generation, rather than 
diversification to, and investment in, more capital-intensive 
renewable energy technologies or efficiency measures. 
Australian generators were able to continue with a base-load 
generation infrastructure that is vulnerable to internationally 
driven energy prices and environmental policy. For these 
reasons, alternative base-load technology options like 
concentrated solar thermal power and geothermal power for 
Australia today remain in their infancy. 
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Deregulation has also established generation, transmission and 
distribution as separate entities or a combination thereof in the 
provision of power. Whilst generation is supplied according  
to price and availability, transmission and distribution tend to 
have monopoly power although pricing is heavily regulated.  
Has the Australian Energy Regulator provided a strategy for the  
optimisation of the entire power economy, or has it focused on 
cost-effective service-provision from each of the separate entities?
State governments played a substantial role in attracting energy 
- intensive aluminium manufacturing to Australia, including  
the provision of long-term preferential electricity tariffs and 
a variety of subsidies which made investment in Australia 
attractive (Simshauser 2001). With electricity tariffs negotiated 
as incentives by government rather than through the market,  
has deregulation had any effect on the attractiveness of the  
Australian power economy to energy-intensive industry, 
though? A related question would be how much incentive, 
or subsidisation, is offered by competitor countries to secure 
energy-intensive industry? Answering these questions is not 
within the scope of this paper, however Australia continues 
to extract its metal ores at increasing revenue contributions, 
perhaps there is a case to use this resources boom to fund 
electricity infrastructure and secure the metals processing and 
fabrication sector for the future.
The third major influence on the power system, federal and 
state regulation, has delivered the Renewable Energy Target 
(RET) to encourage investment in wind generation, and  
Feed-in-Tariffs (FITs) to drive investment in distributed 
photovoltaic (PV) power. These only occurred in any magnitude 
after 2008 and are continually being reset by state governments 
subject to budgetary constraints, providing few guarantees 
for long-term investment decisions. There are claims that the 
FiGure 32: CoMPArisoN GloBAl versus doMestiC Fuel Costs
Sources: (ABARES 1999), (ABARES 2011), (ESAA 1994), (ACIL Tasman 2009), (AEMO 2010), (BP 2010)
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carbon reduction benefit of the investment in PV has come at 
a high cost (Productivity Commission 2011) but, due to the low 
investment by 2008, the costs of PV are not reflected in 2008 
electricity prices.
In summary, a lack of cost drivers in the provision of electricity 
to large consumers has negated any rationale for investment  
in efficiency by consumers, generators and transmitters.  
(This inefficiency has also made the Australian power economy 
more susceptible to future shocks like carbon mitigation.) 
Referring back to figures 10 and 11, evidence for a lack of 
supply efficiency improvement can be found in the increased 
losses between generation and consumption. With respect  
to consumers, the Australian Industry Group conducted an 
online survey in November/December 2010 and found that  
67% of firms had made no efficiency adjustments over the last  
5 years (AIG 2011). 
4.10 eNerGy seCurity
With a large supply of local fuels, Australia is considered to 
have energy security. To date international pricing has not  
been passed through to the Australian cost of electricity.  
If the black coal and gas used in the generation of electricity  
had been priced at global prices, the cost of fuel for the NEM  
in the 2008/09 year would have been considerably more.  
A simple extrapolation of global fuel prices ($8/GJ for gas10   
and $4/GJ for thermal coal) applied to NEM generation in 
2008/09, represented in Figure 34 suggests that the bulk cost  
of electricity in the NEM would have jumped from $53/MWh to 
$74/MWh; an increase of 40%. It is not implied here that this 
level of cost increase could be experienced overnight, but it 
does provide an indication of the potential threat to Australia’s 
power system if global market forces are brought to bear on 
fuel costs.
Energy security is also an issue within Australia. Interconnection 
weaknesses between states remain a thorny issue and are 
contributing to the need for increased generation capacity 
and thus higher investment requirements. This will need to be 
resolved to boost energy security.
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4.11 teChNoloGy PersPeCtives
Thermal power generation in Australia is not efficient. Figure 35 
shows the amount of energy used to produce electricity from 
the combustion process compared to the amount of energy 
supplied to consumers. As can be seen, 76% of the energy 
in brown coal is lost from generation to consumption, with 
the other fossil  fuels supplying slightly higher percentages of 
energy from the energy used. State of the art technology could 
improve coal-fired thermal efficiency to in excess of 45% from 
the fleet average of 31%, and gas fired technology could deliver 
58% thermal efficiency. 
However, the use of non-renewable fuels perpetuates 
vulnerability to non-renwable fuel shortages and global 
price increases, and as shown in the coal-fired generation 
of electricity, fuel costs will establish a floor on the costs of 
electricity generation irrespective of technology improvements 
(McNerney, Farmer et al. 2011). For this reason, there is 
no simple path to follow to achieve competitive resilience. 
Generation reliant on non-renewable fuels will always come 
with potential cost increases in years to come. The provision of 
carbon capture and sequestration adds additional cost and only 
offsets the carbon emission cost associated with fossil fuels. 
Solar and wind generated power have the potential to assume 
significant roles in the power systems of the future. However, 
they are reliant on strategies to enable the power system to 
integrate and manage intermittent power generation at large 
scale. These strategies might consist of a combination of 
energy storage, demand side management, bulk power trading 
across the NEM and dispatchable large consumers. Geothermal 
power could provide substantial base-load generation 
but it continues to struggle with technological challenges. 
Transmission and distribution infrastructure will influence the 
type and quantity of the generation fleet. Competitive resilience 
may only result from the pursuit of a combination of options 
subject to a clear vision of a target position. In the following 
sections we summarise the strengths, weaknesses and key 
features of the technology options available to diversify the 
supply base.
 4.11.1 Power Generation: solar Photovoltaic
There are two basic types of solar energy generation 
technology: solar photovoltaics where solar photon energy is 
directly converted into electricity in a semiconductor material; 
solar thermal in which the sun’s energy is converted into heat, 
steam and ultimately into electricity. Solar PV is a modular 
technology and is applicable from small, distributed domestic 
scale up to utility. Electricity generation based on solar thermal 
technologies requires a high temperature delta in order to 
achieve reasonable energy and capital efficiency. Scale effects 
through utility size are critical for viability.
solar Pv technology status
A small number of relatively mature solar PV technologies 
dominate the market, namely: crystalline silicon (c-Si); 
amorphous thick film silicon (a-Si); and thin film cadmium 
telluride (CdTe). Emerging technologies such as thin film 
copper indium gallium diselenide (CIGS), thin film copper 
indium diselenide (CIS), and concentrating high efficiency triple 
junction (CPV) are predicted to gradually erode market share 
of the generation 1 silicon technologies over the next 5 years 
(currently ~ 80% c-Si). Costs for PV modules have dropped 
considerably in recent times and have more than halved in the 
past 2 years. Current module prices for c-Si and CdTe are now 
< $2/W with manufacturing costs < $1/W. Correspondingly the 
utility-scale “system” prices (including all balance of systems) 
have now dropped to < $4/W meaning an estimated LCoE  
over plant lifetime of $200-$300 / MW h dependent upon 
location, financing costs, etc. World production capacity for  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Black coal Brown coal Natural gas
Ef
fi
ci
en
cy
 (e
n
er
gy
 in
/e
ne
rg
y 
su
p
p
lie
d)
State of the art Australia
FiGure 35: AustrAliAN PoWer eNerGy iNPut/eNerGy suPPlied
Source: (IEA 2010), (IEA 2010), (ESAA 2010)
         November 2011        37
The SWOT analyses below provide a synopsis of the 
PV potential to assume a significant role in future power 
economies.
sWot - Photovoltaics - utility size sWot -  Photovoltaics - decentralised
strengths
• Renewable, operation  
 CO2 free
• Technology mature,   
 40GW in operation  
 (2010)Grid parity  
 expected in 7-10 yrs.
• Scale versatility  
 10 W – 1000 MW
• Direct energy conversion
• Excellent resources in  
 Australia 
opportunities
• PV hubs > 500 MW
• Natural hedge against  
 fossil fuel prices
• Potential to defer or 
 replace grid augmentation
 
Weaknesses
• Intermittent and partly  
 dispatchable without  
 storage or backup
• Energy intensive  
 production but energy  
 payback now <2 years  
 and falling
• Capital intensive for  
 installation 
threats
• Dedicated Transmission  
 infrastructure, generation  
 capacity often distant to  
 load centers
• Integration of larger  
 intermittent PV capacity  
 requires increased costly  
 flexible control energy  
 (peaking capacity) 
• Technical challenges of  
 power systems need to  
 be explored for large  
 scale PV
strengths
• Renewable, operation  
 CO2 free
• Technology mature
• Grid parity expected in  
 < 5 yrs For domestic and  
 commercial/industrial
• Scale versatility
• Reduction of Distribution  
 grid load
• Excellent resources in  
 Australia
• Low loss - proximity  
 generation consumer
opportunities
• Deferred Distribution grid  
 investments
• PV decentralized power  
 generation
• Natural hedge against  
 fossil fuel prices
• Commercial/industrial  
 scale PV well suited  
 for scale and load profile  
 reasons
Weaknesses
• Intermittent and  
 non-dispatchable without  
 storage or backup
• Institutional change  
 - PG with consumer
• Capital intensive  
 - low scale
threats
• If large capacity is  
 installed - back-up  
 through full capacity  
 network or energy storage  
 required
• Technical challenges of  
 power systems need to  
 be explored for dispersed  
 uncontrolled PVs
PV exceeded 16GW in 2010 with estimated cumulative installed 
capacity of 40GW. The firm-prediction of production capacity 
in 2011 is 22GW with an associated ~$7B of capital investment 
in manufacturing capability. Looking forward, this exponential 
growth is set to continue with sub $150 / MW h being plausible 
by 2015. The European PV Industry Association predicts a total 
global installed capacity of between 130 and 190 GW in 2015. 
The IEA predicts a global installed capacity in excess of 400 
GW by 2035.
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technology deployment: solar Pv
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4.11.2 Power Generation - solar thermal
Concentrating solar thermal technology status 
Concentrating Solar Thermal (CST) technology is also 
relatively mature with the first utility-scale plants built in the 
80s (Solar Energy Generating System in the Mojave Desert) 
in response to the oil crisis. Irrespective of the exact “flavour” 
of the technology, CST relies upon using tracking mirrors to 
concentrate the sun’s energy in a line or point focus onto an 
absorbing heating element. Variants of CST concentrating 
elements include linear parabolic trough, compact linear Fresnel 
reflectors, heliostatic tower and solar concentrating dish (the 
latter two being higher temperature point focus systems and the 
former two being line concentration systems). The concentrated 
solar energy can be used to heat a working fluid, create 
steam and drive a turbine (or equivalent engine), or, in the high 
temperature case a more efficient thermodynamic process or 
chemical reaction. CST technology has the stated advantage 
of being able to provide base load power using relatively low 
cost and simple thermal storage approaches with high specific 
heat capacity materials such as molten salt or graphite block. 
Furthermore, the thermal steam process has direct synergies 
with standard coal and gas generation with strong potential 
for low carbon augmentation (as per the Kogan Creek Solar 
Boost Project which will improve the efficiency of the power 
plant by using solar technology to heat feedwater for the boiler). 
Current global installed capacity of CST is - 1.2GW (2011) with 
the largest plants in the 50-100MW range. The Solar Dawn 
consortium will soon commence building Australia’s largest CST 
plant in 2012 (250MW also at Kogan Creek in Queensland) and 
the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating  System in California’s 
Mojave Desert (BrightSource) is currently the largest plant  
under construction (392MW). Due to the relatively low levels  
of installed capacity, the CST LCoE is relatively high  
($200 - $300MW h) but like PV, this is due to drop as the 
estimated 17.5GW of current projects globally are built and 
commissioned over the next 5 years. The IEA predicts a global 
installed capacity of 91 GW by 2035.
strengths
• Renewable, operation  
 CO2 free
• Technology advanced,  
 1.2 GW in operation
• Grid parity expected in  
 5-10 yrs.
• Heat storage simple  
 technology
• Excellent resources in  
 Australia
• Very suited to thermal  
 plant augmentation
• Very suited to gas/coal  
 hybrid and synergistic with  
 geothermal
opportunities
• CSP hubs > 1 GW
• Natural hedge against  
 fossil fuel prices
• Efficiency booster for  
 CFPP (coal)
• Synergies with CCGT
Weaknesses
• Intermittent and partly  
 dispatchable unless  
 hybridised or used with  
 storage
• Large scale essential for  
 cost advantages
threats
• Dedicated Transmission  
 infrastructure
• Larger capacity – requires  
 Integrated Transmission  
 Network, back-up  
 generation or storage
The SWOT analysis below provides a synopsis of the solar 
thermal potential to assume a significant role in future power 
economies. 
sWot – solar thermal
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technology deployment: solar thermal
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4.11.3  Power Generation - Wind
Wind generation technology status
 • Global installed wind generation capacity was 197GW  
  in  2010 
 • On-shore and off-shore wind-farms have reached utility  
  scale (London array, offshore 1000MW) 
 • Intermittent generation requires system integration,  
  transmission capacity and energy storage 
 • Significant deployment has led to cost reductions and  
  efficiency improvements reaching grid parity in many  
  regions with strong wind resources 
 • In the Australian context, South Australia has good  
  to excellent resources but grid strength and the grid  
  interconnection with other states constrain greater levels  
  of deployment at this point in time.
The SWOT analysis below provides a synopsis of the wind 
generation potential to assume a significant role in future power 
economies.
sWot – Wind
strengths
• Renewable, operation  
 CO2 free
• Technology mature,  
 200 GW in operation
• Grid parity reached or  
 close
• Good wind resources in  
 Southern Australia
opportunities
• Wind farms  
 on-/off-shore > 1 GW
• Natural hedge against  
 fossil fuel prices
Weaknesses
• Intermittent and  
 non-dispatchable
• Large scale required
• Visual
• Noise
threats
• Dedicated Transmission  
 infrastructure, as  
 generation capacity often  
 distant to load centers
• Integration of larger wind  
 generation capacity  
 requires increased flexible  
 control energy  
 (peaking capacity) 
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4.11.4 energy/electricity storage - utility scale
electricity storage technology status
 • A key functionality of energy storage facilities is to provide  
  and absorb flexible energy (power). That means the  
  storage reacts similarly to a rapid response power plant in  
  peak-load situations and like a dispatchable large  
  consumer in times of power oversupply. 
 • Large scale storage technologies are of key importance  
  as they can provide flexible control energy to backup  
  intermittent generation technologies; increase grid  
  reliability; reduce peak demand and most importantly  
  improve asset utilisation. There are currently many  
  research and development programs, however current  
  capacity is insufficient to make any impact on networks. 
 • Globally, hydro pump storage facilities amount to 127  
  GW and pump storage is the only reliable storage  
  technology of utility scale today. Of this amount, Australia  
  has 1.5 GW of hydro pump storage with little opportunity  
  for any additional large scale projects. 
  o Other potential storage technologies include: Physical:  
   air pressure storage; heat storage (molten salt, basalt,  
   water); 
  o Electro-chemical: batteries (lithium); 
  o Chemical storage: production of hydrogen, methane,  
   methanol 
  o Electrical: super conducting coils. 
 • Air pressure and heat storage have lower efficiency,  
  battery storage is capital intensive, and the remaining  
  technologies are at an early stage of development  
  although US stimulus funding may catalyse new   
  storage demonstrations by 2012.
 • An IEA working paper predicts 100-150GW of additional  
  global storage capacity will be needed by 2035 to balance  
  power systems- if renewable intermittent sources   
  contribute around 20% of power. However, based on the  
  data shown in Figure 40, Australia will not contribute to the  
  additional amount required until after 2020.
The SWOT analysis below provides a synopsis of the electricity 
storage potential to assume a significant role in future power 
economies.
sWot – electricity / energy storage - utility scale
strengths
• Large scale, fast, flexible  
 controlled energy
• Power provision and  
 absorption
• CO2 free, emission free
• Modular, so can be scaled  
 up if required
opportunities
• Ensures supply meets  
 demand 
• Facilitates system  
 integration of intermittent  
 power generation
• Other physical and  
 chemical storage  
 technologies are emerging
Weaknesses
• Limited hydro resources,  
 being the most mature  
 technology, available in  
 Australia
• Capital intensive, long  
 project horizons
• Large land footprint  
 required close to the  
 source of generation
threats
• Insufficient hydro storage  
 capacity in Australia
• Alternative storage  
 technologies are immature
• Size of Australian market  
 is a deterrent to some  
 suppliers
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technology deployment: electricity energy storage
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One of the main barriers to deployment of storage is the 
levelised cost of delivered energy using storage as shown in 
Figure 41. This indicates that currently only hydro pumped 
storage and compressed air are in a position to compete with 
CCGT as an option for integration and power quality issues 
associated with the introduction of higher levels of renewables.
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4.11.5  Power Generation - Geothermal (hot dry rock (hdr) or  
   enchanced Geothermal systems)
Geothermal technology status
 • Geothermal energy is capable of contributing large-scale,  
  low-emission base load power. At present there are  
  technical and cost barriers to large scale implementation.  
  These are expected to be able to be overcome in the  
  medium term.
 • HSD - Hot sedimentary aquifers are only viable in regions  
  with district heating markets.
 • HDR – Hot Dry Rock or EGS – Enhanced geological  
  systems provides potential for higher temperatures and  
  therefore higher efficiencies however there are only a  
  handful of small power plants operating today.
 • To improve efficiency rates, staged steam cycles such  
  as binary cycles or kalina cycles are required which  
  increases technological complexity and investment costs.
 • The IEA predicts relatively small global deployment  
  due to the location of the resource. However there  
  is significant available resource within Australia to make  
  a significant contribution but it will be constrained by  
  network infrastructure requirements.
The SWOT analysis below provides a synopsis of the 
geothermal potential to assume a significant role in future power 
economies.
sWot - Geothermal
strengths
• Baseload, renewable,  
 CO2 free
• Technology proven, 11 GW  
 in operation
• Synergies with heat based  
 generation technologies,  
 i.e. solar thermal, CCGT
• Excellent, large geothermal  
 resources in Australia’s  
 uninhabited areas
• Primary energy inherent
opportunities
• Geothermal hubs > 5 GW
• Natural hedge against  
 fossil fuel prices
• Synergies with  
 solar-thermal technologies
• Could facilitate an  
 Integrated Transmission  
 Network in Australia
Weaknesses
• Limited hydro resources,  
 being the most mature  
 technology, available in  
 Australia
• Capital intensive, long  
 project horizons
• Large land footprint  
 required close to the  
 source of generation
threats
• Insufficient hydro storage  
 capacity in Australia
• Alternative storage  
 technologies are immature
• Size of Australian market  
 is a deterrent to some  
 suppliers
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The Australian Government believes that geothermal energy will 
make a significant contribution to Australia’s Renewable Energy 
Target by 2020. However, as shown in Figure 42, due to the 
long lead periods required to establish geothermal generation 
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FiGure 42: GloBAl dePloyMeNt oF GeotherMAl
Source: (IEA 2010), (UNData 2011)
facilities and the current lack of network infrastructure from the 
areas where the greatest resources are located, the majority of 
the growth to 2035 will occur post-2020.
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4.11.6  Power Generation – Nuclear
Nuclear technology status:
 • The lifecycle cost has been shown to be very high, and  
  disposal of spent fuel and decommissioned power plants  
  remains problematic. 
 • Renaissance of Nuclear Power is limited to countries,  
  where state owned utilities or governments shoulder  
  the risk. 
 • Substantial risks associated with fuel supply, operational  
  costs and decommissioning 
 • Decommissioning costs are not part of cost calculations  
  today. 
 • Australia has substantial viably extractable Uranium  
  resources (i.e. Olympic dam) 
 • Technology competence centres: US, Germany, France,  
  UK, Russia, Japan 
 • 2010:  Reactors in operation 443, under construction 62,  
  planned 140 
 • Number of reactors expected to decline by 20% in 2020 
 • Fuel price impact on generation cost is as low as 10% 
 • In Germany the development and decommissioning of  
  nuclear power technology is heavily subsidised.
The SWOT analysis below provides a synopsis of the 
nuclear potential to assume a significant role in future power 
economies.
The SWOT analysis below provides a synopsis of the 
nuclear potential to assume a significant role in future power 
economies.
sWot - Nuclear
strengths
• Baseload Power
• CO2 free, emission free
• Technology mature
• Long-term availability of  
 fuel
opportunities
• Reliable Baseload Power
• Potential hedge against  
 fossil fuel prices
• Possible bridging  
 technology
Weaknesses
• Capital intensive
• Technology intensive
• Financial risks beyond  
 private enterprises  
 capabilities
• Unsolved waste storage  
 technology
• Generation cost  
 (~100$/MWh), excluding  
 decommissioning
• Decommissioning 15 yrs,  
 $5 billion
• Large scale required
threats
• Small risk of failure, but  
 with potentially  
 catastrophic  
 consequences
• Absorption of financial  
 and technical resources
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technology deployment: Nuclear
 • 57GW under construction: 25GW in China, 8GW in  
  Russia, 6GW in Korea, 4GW in India,  
 • 59GW planned: 15GW in China, 13GW in Japan, 10GW  
  in Korea, 8GW in Europe, 6GW in UAE
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4.11.7  Carbon dioxide Capture and storage
Carbon capture and storage technology status
 • Carbon Capture and Storage is an Energy Intensive  
  Process: 
  o Sequestration – Carbon Capture  0.2 MWh/t CO2 
    (pre- and post-combustion)  
  o CO2Transportation 0.1MWh/t CO2/400km 
  o Treatment and storage 0.15 MWh/t/CO2
 • Molecular dimension of Hydrocarbons (small) and CO2  
  (large) differ substantially 
 • With CO2 storage, oxygen is also stored under ground 
 • Significant infrastructure requirements  
 • There are a few small pilot programs in early stages of  
  testing
The SWOT analysis below provides a synopsis of Carbon 
capture and storage potential to assume a significant role in 
future power economies.
sWot - Carbon Capture and storage - CCs
technology deployment: Carbon capture and storage
 • Related use of the carbon capture technology   
  has been deployed to improve gas and oil extraction in  
  eight Carbon Capture plants currently in operation,  
  capturing carbon from gas fields and fuel processing  
  plants  with 2.7 million tonnes of carbon per annum  
  reinjected into reservoirs and 21.5 million tonnes of  
  carbon per annum used for enhanced oil recovery 
 • A 450 MW Integrated Gasification Combined   
  Cycle Power Plant (gas turbine) with pre-combustion  
  carbon capture is in planning (RWE, Muehlheim,   
  Germany) 
 • According to the Global Carbon Capture and Storage  
  Institute, current projects planned could result in total  
  capture and storage of carbon from 29GW of power  
  plants before 2020
strengths
• Enables low carbon fossil  
 fuel based power generation
• Pre- and post-combustion  
 carbon sequestration  
 technologies are proven
opportunities
• Possible bridging  
 technology
• CO2 recycling
Weaknesses
• CO2 sequestration,  
 transportation and  
 storage is energy intensive 
• Electrical efficiency of  
 fossil power station  
 reduced by 30-50 %
• Capital intensive  
 infrastructure -  
 comparable to reversed  
 natural gas infrastructure
• Storage technology -  
 experimental
threats
• Consumption of financial  
 and technical resources 
         November 2011        53
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2010 2016 2020
CS
S D
ep
lo
ym
en
t (
GW
 g
en
er
ati
on
 ca
pt
ur
ed
)
2035 (29 MW)
Australia
Korea/UAE
Canada
China
USA
OECDEur
FiGure 44: GloBAl dePloyMeNt oF CCs
Source: (GCCSI 2011), (IEA 2010)
54         Part 1: Australia’s global position
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
Le
v
e
li
se
d
 C
o
st
 o
f 
E
n
e
rg
y
 (
$
/M
W
h
)
4.11.8 Comparative Costs of technology options 
It is a complex task to compare the absolute costs of electricity 
from various technologies. One of the more common, accepted 
methodologies is the Levelised Cost of Energy (LCoE) which 
seeks to provide a single cost price for every KWh of electricity 
for the plant’s useful life.
We have performed an LCoE analysis on the technologies 
discussed in this section based on a range of overnight and 
operating costs provided by ESAA, Worley Parsons, AEMO, 
ACIL Tasman, Georgia Power and EPRI. Figure 45 provides a 
comparison of the levelised costs for the technologies today 
based on a gas price of $4/GJ, a coal price of $1.50/GJ, a 
uranium price of $0.83/GJ, a $23 /tCO2e carbon price and a  
$40 REC price until 2020. 
The bar in the middle of each option provides the average 
of those projections. Evidenced by the escalation of wind 
power deployment around the world, wind power generation 
is now within reach of the coal and gas fired generation cost. 
FiGure 45: levelised Cost oF eleCtriCity: teChNoloGy CoMPArisoN (GAs $4/GJ,  
CoAl $1.50/GJ, urANiuM, $0.83/GJ, $23 CArBoN PriCe, $40 reC)
Source: (Wagner and Foster 2011)
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Geothermal offers cost effective potential but needs to 
overcome its implementation challenges. Nuclear too provides 
cost effective potential but needs to overcome its uninsurable 
risk and storage challenges. The solar technologies still present 
a cost challenge but with the projected deployments around the 
world, prices should reduce substantially. 
Figure 46 provides a comparison of the levelised cost of 
electricity for the major technology types relative to their 
emissions intensity. As with figure 45, it can be seen that the 
levelised cost of (emission free) wind power is now almost on 
a par with the levelised cost of (interim emissions intensive) 
open cycle gas turbine power generation. Wind power, however, 
doesn’t generate base-load power. Nuclear and geothermal 
offer emission free base-load power, but are plagued with 
insurance and waste risks for nuclear and technological risk 
for geothermal. Solar thermal with storage is, at this stage 
expensive but, the only risk-free technology available for 
emission free base-load power generation.
FiGure 46: levelised Cost versus eMissioNs iNteNsity
Source: (Wagner et.al 2009)
56         Part 1: Australia’s global position
Australia needs to offer a competitive power economy to attract 
energy-intensive industry. Historically, offering a competitive 
power economy enabled Australia to attract investment after 
the oil shocks of the 1970, and as a result build an electricity 
backbone for capital intensive industry. How prepared Australia, 
and its competitors, are for the shocks of the future, is 
represented in Figure 47 based on the IEA’s modelling.
FiGure 47: PoWer eCoNoMy resilieNCe 2035
Source: (IEA 2010), (ESKOM 2008), (ESAA 1994), 
(ABS 2011), (IEA 2011)
Australia’s relative position will have deteriorated.  
Whilst it will still be more resilient than South Africa and 
India, its improvement on India will have decreased from 
39% in 2008 to 8% in 2035
23% of Australia’s electricity will come from renewable 
energy compared to 29% worldwide. Only South Africa 
and Russia will have a smaller proportion of electricity 
from renewable energy. Australia will be relatively more 
vulnerable to fossil fuel price shocks.
Australia is projected to shift one quarter of its generation 
from coal to gas and renewables, but that will still leave 
generation from coal at 53%. Only China and South Africa 
will generate proportionately more electricity from coal.
Australia will be relatively more vulnerable to shocks from 
reduced diversity. 
Australia will have increased its industry consumption of 
electricity by 35% compared to China’s increase of 165% 
and India’s increase of 290%.
Australia will continue to lose market share of metals 
processing to China and India.
The McKinsey Global Institute warns that interest rates 
may be on a long term rise as a result of the investment 
demands of very populous developing countries. Delayed 
investment decisions as a result of uncertainty will 
increase investment costs
Australian electricity will be impacted by higher financing 
costs
How	the	look	to	the	future	shows	Australia’s	risk	profile.
5 power economy risK proFile  
 - a looK to tHe Future
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Figure 48 shows Australia’s relative resilience to the competitor 
countries in 2008 and in 2035. To be on an equal footing with 
its competitors, Australia’s relative resilience should rotate on 
the 0% grid line. In general, Australia is less resilient than its 
competitors. In 2008 Australia was 39% more resilient than 
India and 14% more resilient than South Africa, but by 2035 the 
IEA modelling predicts that Australia will be 8% more resilient 
than India and 4% more resilient than South Africa.
Greater investment in renewable energy will improve 
Australia’s non-renewable fuel use, its carbon emissions 
and its diversity of generation
Offering incentives for more efficient coal fired generation, 
in particular encouraging a shift away from brown coal fired 
generation, will improve Australia’s generation efficiency
Investing in high voltage transmission infrastructure will 
improve Australia’s transmission efficiency and reduce its 
requirement for new generation capacity to service peak 
load
Offering incentives to replace aged power plants with 
Concentrated Solar Thermal plants (with storage) rather 
than gas fired power plants will encourage a shift away 
from base-load generation vulnerable to global price 
pressures
Focusing on the whole power system rather than on the 
component parts is required. A national policy framework 
taking into account the whole power economy will ensure 
that the optimum level of investment is made for the 
targeted outcome
With an ageing fleet of base-load generators, Australia 
has a golden opportunity NOW to make the leap to a 
resilient power economy instead of shuffling forward 
based on business as usual, but it will require planning and 
commitment by the key stakeholders to identify and shift to 
this new paradigm
Government, large power users and residential end-users 
each have roles in this transformation process. China and 
India have already formulated the strategic vision of their 
power economies and are moving forward not because 
they have to, but because they are preparing for the future. 
Australia too needs to prepare NOW for a power economy 
fit for the future 
Australia’s options to improve power economy resilience
FiGure 48: AustrAliA’s CoMPArAtive resilieNCe 2008 ANd 2035
Source: (IEA 2010)
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6.3 WhiCh PoliCies Will Be Most  
 eFFeCtive iN FACilitAtiNG  
 the trANsForMAtioN to  
 iMProved resilieNCe ANd   
 CoMPetitiveNess?
The renewable energy target and a carbon price are the only 
measures currently under consideration to transition the power 
economy to greater resilience. These policies will not influence 
the quality and efficiency of the transmission and distribution 
systems nor do they take into account the optimal mix required 
to balance loads and manage demand. A full range of policies 
should be introduced that lead to optimal infrastructure 
investments rather than just deploy single measures like a 
carbon price or a renewable energy target.
6.4 WhAt Will eNerGy ANd CAPitAl  
 iNteNsive iNdustries Be eXPeCtiNG  
 FroM PoWer eCoNoMies iN the  
 NeXt 2 deCAdes?
In 1990, Australian electricity was relatively more expensive 
than it is today and yet it still attracted energy intensive industry 
investment. Was it preferential tariffs negotiated by State 
Governments to boost employment, or was it the prospect 
of a secure power supply that brought them to Australia? 
Possibly a combination of both but nearly two decades of 
carefully managed electricity pricing have resulted in relatively 
less expensive electricity, and yet Australia has lost market 
share in metals processing to China and India. It is generally 
accepted that price should never be the unique selling feature 
of a sale and, in this context, consideration needs to be given 
to balancing cost concerns with resilience requirements, to 
attract energy intensive firms that adopt a long view in making 
investment decisions especially since Australia can offer many 
other benefits like stable Government and protection of rights.
This paper has analysed Australia’s current position with 
respect to the competitiveness of our power economy.  
We have compared our past and present position and potential 
future trajectories versus mineral rich competitor countries. 
The Resilience Index gives us a quantitative measure by which 
to reduce this multi-variant comparison and business as usual 
for Australia shows increased risk from a continued lack of 
resilience. Based upon this analysis one can extract a number 
of key drivers and associated questions that require solutions 
and answers. These are:
6.1 WhAt is the oPtiMAl MiX oF   
 GeNerAtioN teChNoloGies to   
 MAXiMise resilieNCe?
Australia’s current mix of largely fossil-fuel based technologies 
makes it vulnerable to non-renewable fuel shocks and 
carbon emission constraints. This paper does not suggest 
that all fossil-fuel based generation be replaced immediately 
but it would appear that power economies with substantial 
generation from renewables like Canada are far-better placed 
than Australia to meet the energy challenges of the next few 
decades. Consideration needs to be given to the optimum 
generation mix for Australian competitive resilience.
6.2 WhAt is the Best trANsMissioN  
 iNFrAstruCture to oPtiMise   
 iNvestMeNt?
How might Australia design its network infrastructure to meet 
its peak load demand through the use of renewable sources, 
demand shifting and energy storage thereby optimising the 
amount of investment required? Consideration needs to be 
given to a strategy for the whole power economy rather than on 
meeting the requirements of each of the institutional entities.
6 conclusion
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6.5 hoW MiGht AustrAliA FuNd   
 suBstANtiAl iNvestMeNt to shiFt  
 to A resilieNt PoWer eCoNoMy?
In an environment where global investment is focussed on 
the developing world, funding the shift to resilient power 
could become a real challenge for Australia. Consideration 
needs to be given to funding options available for investing 
in a shift to greater competitive resilience. In particular, many 
of the competitor countries rely on Government led initiates 
to facilitate investment in the power economy. The Australian 
Government should also consider taking the lead in initiating 
investment in the power economy.
6.6 Are there liMits to eFFiCieNCy 
 iMProveMeNts?
In the main, efficiency improvements have positive pay backs, 
but is there a floor and/or a ceiling to the electricity intensity 
of an economy, beyond which gains become losses? The key 
attribute of resilience is the ability to absorb variation, but to 
do that the system requires diversity and redundancy. A focus 
on efficiency only may remove the essential diversity and 
redundancy required for resilience. Conversely, a lack of focus 
on efficiency may lose the benefits to be gained from prudent 
resource use. A much better understanding of this trade off 
is required in formulating policies that target a preferred ratio 
between electricity and GDP. 
6.7 other QuestioNs
There are other questions that have surfaced in this discussion. 
Is Australia utilising its metal ores to build a robust economy? 
Is Australia’s energy consumption impacting negatively on its 
growth?  A further question that is not expressly posed but 
is implicit in the discussion is how countries have kept prices 
down? It is not sufficient to assume that current prices are 
an accurate reflection of consistent policies. For instance, 
how much historic subsidisation is reflected in South African, 
Russian and Canadian pricing? These questions are important 
but outside the scope of the reflections on the Australian power 
economy discussed in this paper.
60         Part 1: Australia’s global position
The research conducted for this discussion paper has produced 
some interesting findings and led to a number of pertinent 
questions for stakeholders in the power economy to consider. 
As a result future discussion papers on delivering a competitive 
Australian power system are planned. Part 2 of the series will 
look at Australia’s target position (where we need to be) and 
will seek input from stakeholders to achieve a consensus of 
the targeted position. Part 3 of the series will look at Australia’s 
transition to a competitive power system (how we get there) 
and once again will seek input from stakeholders to achieve 
consensus of the possible roadmap(s) to reach the target. It is 
envisaged that the series of discussion papers on “Delivering 
a competitive Australian power system” will provide valuable 
input for stakeholders and the general public.
7 Future Discussion papers
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APPeNdiX B: BuildiNG A resilieNCe iNdeX 
For the PoWer eCoNoMy
Resilience is the ability of a system to absorb external shocks. 
Key attributes of resilience are:
 • The ability of a system to absorb variation 
 • That keystone processes of the system interact, and even  
  overlap, in an apparently redundant way 
 • That the system is able to generate major changes and  
  renewal at small scales 
 • That the system is composed of functional group variety
Enabling resilience requires:
 • Monitoring 
 • Capacity to respond 
 • Political will
so, how does this relate to a power economy?  
The provision of power is an integrated network of keystone 
processes that interact with each other to provide a service 
to consumers. Upon this network is built a further integrated 
network of economic transactions with its own set of keystone 
processes that interact with each other to meet the fundamental 
needs of society. Because the economy is reliant on the power 
network to complete its transactions, its success or otherwise 
is dependent on, amongst other things, the performance of the 
power network. 
Why	resilience,	why	not	just	efficiency?
Efficiency is important for sustainability. If non-renewable 
resources aren’t conserved they may become scarce and hence 
more expensive. To ensure that gross domestic product is 
produced at least cost, and thus welfare maximized, care needs 
to be taken to use the optimum quantities of resources.  
But efficiency does not address the need for adaptation in 
that it is focused on improving current processes rather than 
preparing for completely different, unplanned, requirements 
that might eventuate in the future.  Creative destruction is a 
good example of how economist Joseph Schumpeter views the 
adaptation process to address different, unplanned activities.  
Resilience on the other hand, is concerned with something 
more akin to creative restructure. Instead of focusing all 
resources on efficiency, resilience requires that if resources 
are also focused on diversity and redundancy, the process of 
adaptation is much more comfortable. This is why resilience is 
essential for the orderly management of change.
Why do we need a composite index to measure resilience?
Our society is comfortable with the provision of information in 
a single metric. Price is the most important composite metric in 
that it embodies many different variables within a single transfer 
of information that facilitates decision making. Economics has 
delivered to society a plethora of composite indices that provide 
us with data from how our economy is tracking, to the health 
of our financial systems,  and the human development index 
which enables  us to rank how well disparate societies’ are 
addressing the needs of their people. Within the same context, 
to understand the resilience of an integrated power network, 
it is important to measure many different metrics which will 
indicate how the integrated network is performing today and 
how it might react to substantial change. 
how were the resilience measures selected?
As mentioned previously, efficiency is important, but not the 
only metric required to assess resilience. Within the power 
economy resilience index there are four efficiency measures:
 • Non-renewable fuel use per KWh  consumed, provides  
  evidence of the use of fuels that may have a limited  
  life span. Where fuel use is high, the system is vulnerable  
  to price increases that may result from the market   
  anticipating fuel use scarcity. 
  mtoe non-renewable fuel used /Total  GWh consumed
 • Carbon emissions per KWh generated provides evidence  
  of the waste from the production process, which makes  
  the system vulnerable to increased costs if society  
  imposes a cost on pollution for polluters. 
  tCO2e emitted / Total GWh generated
 • Generation efficiency is the amount of energy used in the  
  generation of KWh. Inefficient processes ensure that above  
  optimal consumption of resources will in the long-run cost  
  society more. 
  mtoe fossil fuel  used/ GWh fossil fuel power generated
 • Distribution efficiency is the amount of energy lost between  
  generation and consumption. This includes the amount of  
         November 2011        65
 • Coal, gas, nuclear and geothermal generators have a  
  potential 90% capacity 
 • Oil generators have a potential 50% capacity reflecting   
  their remote, off-grid  installation characteristic 
 • Wind, solar, marine, and biomass always operate at  
  capacity 
 • Hydro generation is subject to too many variables to  
  assess potential capacity, so is assumed to have 20%  
  in reserve. 
 • Heat generation. Too little data is available for this   
  calculation, so it is assumed to have 20% in reserve.
The composite index methodology follows the same methodology 
as the Human Development Index as calculated until 2010.
 1. Transform the raw variable of each measure into a unit-free  
  index between 0 and 1 as follows:
         
  x index =        
  
  Where min(x) and max(x) are the best of the group less  
  10%, and the worst of the group plus 10%, respectively.
 2. Calculates the geometric mean of the 7 normalised indices  
  to show the power economy resilience indicators:
  Power economy resilience = 7   a.b.c.d.e.f.g
  Where: 
  a =  mtoe non-renewable fuel used/Total KWh consumed 
  b =  tons of carbon emissions /Total KWh generated 
  c =  probability that next watt will be from a different fuel  
    type 
  d =  percentage of energy generated from non-renewable  
    fuel used (Generation efficiency) 
  e =  percentage of energy lost between generation and  
    consumption (Distribution efficiency) 
  f =  percentage of Total KWh from external source  
    (Security of supply) 
  g =  unused kWk/$GPD (redundant generation for use  
    in GDP)
max(x)-min(x)
x-min(x)
  energy used by the energy industry in generation (auxiliary  
  use), mining energy, transmission and distribution losses 
  KWh generated plus imported / Total KWh consumed 
security too is important to realize resilience. For this reason, 
there is one security measure:
 • Security of supply which measures the amount of   
  fuel that is imported for electricity plus the amount of  
  actual electricity that is imported/exported measures  
  how dependent the system is on other countries for the  
  provision of their electricity 
  Proportion of GWh from imported fuel  plus GWh imported  
  / Total GWh supplied
There are two resilience measures which seek to establish 
diversity and redundancy:
 • Diversity of fuel type which measures diversity by   
  calculating the probability that the next watt will be  
  generated from a different fuel type. This measure is  
  based on a generic diversity calculation and is used  
  in a variety of measurements from biodiversity (Simpson’s  
  diversity index) to market competition (Herfindahl Index).  
  The probability that the next watt will be from the same  
  fuel type is defined here as the sum of the squares of the  
  percentage of generation from each fuel type within the  
  power system. To establish the probability that the next  
  watt will be from a different fuel type is:
  P(different fuel type)=1-SNi=1s2
  where 
  N = number of different fuel types
  S = proportion of generation from each fuel type
 • Redundant electricity which measures the amount of  
  spare energy available for use in the economy and seeks  
  to assess the redundancy within the power system.  
  It is calculated as  
  (Total KWh possible at capacity less KWh generated) /  
  Total GDP  
  and notably a high proportion of KWh is deemed to  
  be good and a low proportion of KWh is deemed to be  
  detrimental. There are a number of assumptions that have  
  to be made to be able to calculate this metric, namely:
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CoMPetitive PositioNs At  
1990, 2008 ANd 2035
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CoMPAriNG the CoMPosite iNdeX FroM 
2008 to 2020 ANd 2035
The power economy resilience index as calculated for each year 
has no absolute minimum and maximum values for each of the 
measures because the countries selected are a subset of the 
global group and thus it is not possible to establish absolute 
measures against which to compare. As countries improve 
or reduce their performance, especially countries with the 
highest and lowest measures, the relative calculation changes 
substantially making comparison between different periods 
complicated and not necessarily informative. As an example 
consider comparing the GDP in 2010 to the GDP in 1990 both 
at current prices. GDP at 2010 will include inflationary measures 
which obscure the base information sought to establish the 
real growth of the economy since 1990.It is for this reason, 
that constant dollar measures are used for year on year 
comparisons when measuring GDP growth.
To eliminate the underlying relative position shifting associated 
with the change in minimum and maximum values for each 
measure, comparison of Power Economy Resilience in 2008 to 
1990, and to 2020 and 2035, is based on 2008 minimum and 
maximum values.
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CoMPAriNG the CoMPosite iNdeX  
FroM 1990 to 2008
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